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Abstract 
The impacts of fund mergers and liquidations are significant as the managed funds 
industry continues to evolve. This thesis fills a much needed gap in the managed 
funds literature through providing insight into causes and implications of mergers and 
liquidation of managed funds. The thesis explores this through a number of aspects. 
Firstly, the thesis develops a framework for conceptualising the causes of managed 
funds termination and describes the differences between strategic mergers, distressed 
mergers and liquidations. Then, the thesis investigates the probabilities of fund 
termination for Australian, French and UK managed funds, and the relationship 
between a fund’s probability of termination and various fund characteristics. Further, 
this thesis investigates the determinants for the funds’ termination status and identifies 
factors that influence whether a fund is merged or liquidated. Finally, this thesis 
investigates the impact of alternative weighting schemes on the performance of 
master trusts - which can serve as mitigants for the impact of mergers and 
liquidations, specifically addressing the problem of estimation error in forming master 
trust portfolios.  
 
Results from statistical analysis show important insights into the causes of mergers 
and liquidation of managed funds. It is found that alpha, skewness and fund family 
size are significant factors influencing a fund’s probability of termination, and that a 
larger fund is less likely to terminate. Also, skewness and family size significantly 
influence the termination status of a fund.  From these results, this thesis discusses the 
implications for regulating mergers and liquidations of managed funds. 
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 Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 What are Managed Funds 
The first pooled investment vehicle was born in Switzerland in the nineteenth century 
(Russell 2007, p.6). This idea eventually spread around the world to form a thriving 
industry today. The idea was simple. Many individuals do not have sufficient wealth 
or knowledge to form and maintain a well-diversified portfolio. A professional 
institution can offer investment vehicles for these individuals to pool their money and 
thereby form a larger and more diversified portfolio. All aspects of investment, 
including asset allocation, stock selection and record keeping are undertaken by the 
professional institution. 
 
Nowadays, these investment vehicles are offered around the world. Due to the 
investment vehicles being formed in different legal structures, they are referred to 
under a variety of names. In the United States (US) and Canada, they are called 
mutual funds and unit investment trusts; in the UK, they are called investment trusts 
or unit trusts; in France and Luxembourg, they are called Société d’Investissesment à 
Capital Fixe (SICAF) or Organismes de Placement Collectif en Valeurs Mobiliéres 
(OPCVNS). The European Union refers to these investment vehicles as Undertakings 
for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) (European Commission 
2005).  
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In Australia, “managed fund” is the name referring to pooled investments managed by 
professional institutions. For consistency, this thesis will adopt the term ‘managed 
fund’ (or sometimes ‘fund’ for short) to refer to any pooled investment vehicle 
managed by a professional institution. The Australian terminology is used due to 
Australia being the base country for the study. 
 
A managed fund may be structured as an investment company or a trust. Under an 
investment company structure, individuals invest in the fund through purchasing 
shares of the company. Under a trust structure, individuals invest in the fund through 
becoming beneficiaries under the trust (also known as members of the scheme) (ASIC 
1993). The main difference between the two forms is in ownership of the fund’s 
assets. The investors have no direct or indirect rights or interest in the assets under an 
investment company structure; whereas they are beneficial owners of the underlying 
assets under a trust structure (Russell 2007)  
 
The global managed funds industry has grown rapidly over the last 50 years.  As at 
June 2008, there are $24,710 billion US dollars invested in managed funds across the 
world. The United States (US) has the largest managed funds market in the world, 
followed by Luxembourg and France. Australia has one of the world’s largest onshore 
managed funds markets. According to the Investment Company Institute (ICI), the 
total consolidated assets held by Australian managed funds stand at AUD$1,264.7 
billion as at the end of June 2008, just behind those of the US, Luxembourg and 
France (see Table 1.1). 
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Table 1.1 Size of Managed Fund Industries Ranked by Countries 
Rank Country Total Net Assets in US 
Dollars (Millions) 
1 United States 11,676,870 
2 Luxembourg 2,621,706 
3 France 1,980,274 
4 Australia 1,264,698 
5 Ireland 985,818 
6 United Kingdom 804,797 
7 Brazil 738,485 
8 Japan 687,732 
9 Canada 685,390 
10 Italy 364,397 
Data as at end of June quarter 2008. Sourced from Investment Company Institute, 2008 ICI Fact book. 
 
 
This thesis fills a much needed gap in the managed funds literature through providing 
insight into causes and implications of mergers and liquidation of managed funds. 
The primary focus of this thesis is Australian managed funds. Two countries that have 
similar managed fund markets to Australia were selected for comparison. They are 
France and the United Kingdom (the UK), chosen based on industry size and 
regulatory environment. According to Table 1.1, they have the 3rd and 6th largest 
managed funds markets in the world, respectively (Investment Company Institute 
2008). Unlike Luxembourg, which has mainly offshore funds, France and the UK’s 
fund industries consist of mainly onshore funds. Other than being similar in industry 
 3 
 size, the UK and Australia have historically close links, and the UK has a Common 
Law system similar to Australia. On the other hand, France also has a similar sized 
fund market to Australia but has a Civil Law system. Thus, French results provide 
valuable insights, with a different legal system to Australia and the UK. Furthermore, 
both the UK and France have strong and growing superannuation industries much like 
Australia (Grosse 2004). A comparison of Australia, France and the UK fund market 
size and growth is provided in Figure 1.1. 
 
Note that the US market is not studied in this thesis because there is already a wealth 
of literature on the US market, whereas the UK and France are less studied. However, 
this thesis does refer to research findings based on the US market as well as the 
legislative structure of the US market for comparative purposes. 
 
 
1.2 Types of Managed Funds 
 
The earliest unit trusts invested mainly in government securities. Today’s managed 
funds invest in a variety of asset classes. The common types of asset classes include 
domestic equity, international equity, fixed interest securities, cash, property, 
commodities and mortgage. A managed fund may concentrate its investments in a 
single asset class, for example, an equity fund invests solely in shares; a fixed interest 
fund invests in government bonds and bank bills; and a property fund invests in 
residential or commercial properties. Alternatively, a fund may spread its investments 
across a mixture of asset classes. These funds are called balanced funds or allocation 
funds.  
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 Figure 1.1 Comparison of Australia, France and the UK Fund Market Sizes 
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A market share break down according the types of managed funds is shown in Figure 
1.1. Equity funds constitute the largest proportion of managed funds. The collective 
investment power of managed funds makes them the largest shareholders of many 
corporations. The next largest type is balanced funds, followed by property funds, 
bond funds and cash funds. Funds that cannot be classified into the above categories 
(other funds) make up approximately 23% of all managed funds.  
 
To cater for the different needs of investors, managed fund companies developed 
products with a variety of investment objectives and management styles: growth funds 
typically aim for capital appreciation in their stock selection, while value funds focus 
on capital safety and constant income by investing in undervalued stocks. Blend funds 
refer to a mix of growth and value objectives. Further, managers of actively managed 
funds aim to outperform an investment benchmark index by actively selecting and 
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 monitoring the investments of the fund, whereas managers of passively managed 
funds make few of these investment decisions. Consequently actively managed funds 
generate a higher fee. Index funds are a common type of passively manage fund and 
refer to those funds that track an index. 
 
Figure 1.2 Investment of Australian Managed Funds in Different Asset Classes 
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Data as at end of June quarter 2008. Constructed using data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
Management funds, Document Number “5655.0”. 
 
 
Under the two basic types of legal structures, investment company and trust, there are 
further variations in the structure of a managed fund. Open end funds may issue and 
redeem shares at any time, closed end funds only have a limited number of shares. A 
fund may have units traded on stock exchanges, known as exchange traded funds. 
Managed funds also differ in their clientele and unit sizes. Retail funds are sold in 
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 smaller units and are usually offered to individual investors, and wholesale funds are 
sold in larger units and are usually offered to institutional investors.  
 
In Australia, superannuation funds make up a large proportion of both retail and 
wholesale funds. Compulsory contributions to superannuation funds by employers 
were introduced through Federal government legislation to address the problem of an 
ageing population. Superannuation savings became a prominent part of national 
savings, representing over 70 per cent of total Australian investment funds (Austrade 
2008a). 
 
In the recent decade, hedge funds have been in the spotlight for their innovative and 
sometimes high risk strategies. Hedge funds are largely unregulated or regulated 
private funds that are permitted to undertake a range of activities, including short 
selling and trading in derivatives. There are a wide range of strategies adopted, such 
as market neutral, global macro, directional, event driven, arbitrage, multi-strategy 
and multi-manager.1 A form of hedge funds called fund-of-hedge-funds is a type 
whereby the fund manager invests in a portfolio of individual hedge funds  
 
Platforms are another innovation which became increasingly popular in the recent 
decade. Master trusts and wraps are examples of platform products which allow 
investors to invest in a range of managed funds through one administrative structure. 
The main benefits of investing in platforms include gaining access to wholesale funds, 
achieving diversification across different funds, consolidated reporting of all invested 
funds, and fee advantages (for example, the investment company may not impose 
                                                 
1 For more information on hedge funds see Austrade (2008b) and AIMA/ASSIRT Hedge Fund Booklet 
(2002) published by the Alternative Investment Management Association & ASSIRT. 
 7 
 entry or exit fee for transferring money around different funds, though some may 
charge a switching fee). A wrap is a very similar product to master trust, except that it 
allows the investor to also include direct investments such as investments in shares 
and property (Axiss 2004). 
 
As new managed funds continue to be developed under new asset classes, 
management styles, legal structures, administrative structures and investment 
objectives, the list for the types of managed funds is ever growing. The above 
discussion is by no means a comprehensive list of all types of managed fund. Instead 
it focuses on common types of managed funds to provide a background for later 
chapters. 
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 Table 1.2 Evolution of Australian Managed Funds Industry 
DECADE BIRTH POPULAR NOT 
POPULAR 
1930s First unit trust in 
Australia 
  
1940s    
1950s US-style mutual fund 
 
Property trusts 
Growth or income  
1960s Fund of funds Growth, income or 
balanced funds 
 
1970s  Open-ended funds 
 
 
1980s Cash-management trust 
 
Firms that rank funds 
(e.g. ASSIRT)  
 
Index funds 
Property trusts 
 
Sector-specific trusts 
Balanced products 
1990s  
Managed Investments 
Act 1998 
Super funds 
 
Master trusts 
 
Listed Property Trusts 
 
2000s Exchange-traded funds 
 
Financial Services 
Reform Act 2001 
Hedge funds 
 
Boutique fund 
managers 
 
 
Sources: Mees, Wehner & Hanrahan 2005, Russell 2007, Gallagher 2002 
 9 
   
1.3 Motivation for the Thesis 
 
 
In Australia, the pool of funds under management expanded rapidly over the last two 
decades. As shown in Table 1.3, the total of all Australian Managed Funds 
(Consolidated, $billions) reached $1,319 billon as at June 2008, with annual growth 
rate averaging 12% per year since 1988. The volume of funds under management 
almost tripled during the 1990’s.  
 
According to the 2008 Australian share ownership study by Australia Stock Exchange 
(ASX), 16% of the adult Australian population invested in unlisted managed funds. 
Out of the 16% who invested in unlisted managed funds, 11% invested in both listed 
shares and unlisted managed funds, and 5% invested in unlisted managed funds only. 
In addition, 36% of respondents said they would like to increase the proportion of 
funds to shares, and the proportion investing in unlisted managed funds through a 
Self-Managed Superannuation Fund was 38% (ASX, 2009). Such tremendous growth 
in the managed funds industry makes the regulation of managed funds an important 
area for continuing research. 
 
Fund mergers and liquidations occurred throughout the history of managed funds. 
Their widespread impact often makes them the headline news and famous scandals 
from time to time. Their significant economic and social consequences warrant further 
research. 
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 Table 1.3 Total of Australian Managed Funds (Consolidated, $billions) 
End of Quarter Total consolidated 
funds ($ Millions) 
Growth in funds 
Jun-1988 145,496  
Jun-1989 175,886 20.89% 
Jun-1990 201,361 14.48% 
Jun-1991 217,860 8.19% 
Jun-1992 238,478 9.46% 
Jun-1993 254,834 6.86% 
Jun-1994 282,372 10.81% 
Jun-1995 298,631 5.76% 
Jun-1996 333,698 11.74% 
Jun-1997 397,960 19.26% 
Jun-1998 458,328 15.17% 
Jun-1999 531,674 16.00% 
Jun-2000 603,914 13.59% 
Jun-2001 642,454 6.38% 
Jun-2002 660,562 2.82% 
Jun-2003 690,059 4.47% 
Jun-2004 799,601 15.87% 
Jun-2005 907,026 13.43% 
Jun-2006 1,065,904 17.52% 
Jun-2007 1,366,024 28.16% 
Jun-2008 1,319,459 -3.41% 
Note:  Sourced from Reserve Bank of Australia, Table B.18. End of Quarter values are the values 
reported for the June quarter of each year. 
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 When the first Australian managed fund, Australian Fixed Trusts (AFT), began in 
1936, its popularity quickly attracted other players to the market. By the 1960s, the 
fund industry had grown to offering choices in equity, fixed interest and property 
funds. Equity funds consisted of 75% of the market and offered choices in growth, 
income and balance funds. Growth in the industry was significant as many funds 
offered double digit returns.2 
 
In the 1970s the financial market started to slow and many funds were no longer able 
to offer these returns. Most of the funds were small at the time, with market values of 
under $2 million and each had around 1000 investors. As value of funds under 
management declined, many investors were encouraged to transfer capital to a similar 
vehicle. A series of fund collapses became headline news in the 1970s and alarmed 
investors and regulators. The first was the collapse of the Garretty group in 1971, 
which invested in speculative metal stocks during the late-60s minerals boom. 
Another famous collapse was that of Mineral Securities Australia Ltd in 1971, which 
lost in excess of $5.5 millions in shares and immediately suspended redemptions (see 
Sykes 1995, Mees, Wehner and Hanrahan 2005). 
 
The managed funds sector recovered rapidly in the 1980s. Demand was fuelled by a 
range of government measures to deregulate the financial sector, including 
introduction of foreign banks such as BT, floating of the Australian dollar, and 
removal of limits on foreign investment. Investments in unit trusts grew from less 
than $2 billion in 1980 to over $38 billion in the early 1990s, with the fastest growing 
unit trusts being cash management trusts and property trusts. High inflation during the 
                                                 
2 The development of the Australian managed funds industry has been studied by historians including 
Mees, B.T., Wehner, M.S., and Hanrahan, P.F. (2005) and their paper provides an informative 
background to academics working in the area of Australian managed funds. 
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 1980s also led property trusts to regularly achieve double-digit plus returns. Property 
trusts alone had grown by 49% between June 1988 and 1990 to a peak of $17.9 
billion.  
 
Comprehensive failures across the unlisted property trusts sector brought mergers and 
liquidations of managed funds back into public attention. In 1983, the Trustees 
Executors and Agency Company (TEA) collapsed as a result of property speculation 
(Sykes 1996). Then, during 1989-1992, Tricontinental collapsed through exposure to 
bad loans made to companies. Two more large scale failures, AustWide and Estate 
Mortgage, provoked the Australian Government to pass urgent amendment to 
Corporations Law to freeze unit redemptions (see Armstrong and Gross 1995, Clarke, 
Dean and Oliver 2003). 
 
The slump also led to a couple of fund mergers. Examples include Brick Securities 
merging into National Mutual and Equitable’s trusts merging into Lend Lease and 
GPT (Mees, Wehner and Hanrahan 2005). By June 1992, investments in property 
trusts declined by 30%. Most unlisted property funds transformed into listed property 
trusts or merged into other funds.  
 
The landscape of the managed funds industry is ever changing due to merger and 
acquisition activities. Major mergers of the Australian managed funds include the 
ANZ acquisition of unit trusts pioneer AFT in 1983, AXA acquisition of National 
Mutual in 1996, Commonwealth Bank’s acquisition of Colonial Group, National 
Australia Bank’s acquisition of MLC in 2000, and Westpac Financial Services’ 
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 acquisition of BT financial group in 2002 (Gallagher 2002). A timeline of the major 
events for the Australian managed funds industry is provided in Figure 1.3. 
 
Although mergers and liquidations occur, the regulation of fund mergers and 
liquidations is still an open question in Australia. Liquidations are regulated by the 
Corporations Act 2001. Liquidation provisions for registered managed investment 
schemes are set out under Part 5C.9 “Winding Up” which consists of Section 601NA 
to Section 601NG. Liquidation can be initiated by the investment company, the 
shareholders, the creditors or the court. The legislation provides that a registered 
managed investments scheme may be wound up in one of four circumstances. 
However, there is currently no provision for merger of managed funds in Australia. 
To merge, the target fund has to first go through the liquidation procedure, then 
investors are encouraged to purchase units in the acquiring fund. This process is 
complex and time consuming, and the merger may not succeed if certain individual 
investors are not willing to transfer to the new funds, even if the new fund offers a 
better deal.  
 
Consequently, the Australian Treasury is currently proposing to amend legislation to 
facilitate mergers of managed funds in Australia. Their proposal and findings are 
documented in the Product Rationalization issues paper released for comment on 22 
June 2007 (The Treasury 2007). The issues paper proposes amending the legislation 
to allow “product rationalisation” (a term referring to a mechanism for removing 
outdated products by transferring customers out of these products and into new 
products) in managed investment schemes, superannuation funds and life insurance 
products. Submissions to the issues paper showed some consensus in the need for 
 14 
 merger provisions in legislation, but mixed opinions in the details of the merger 
provisions. For instance, some submissions support that investors should have the 
right to object to the merger, while some do not. 
 
To summarise, the motivation for this thesis is threefold. Firstly, tremendous growth 
in the managed funds industry makes the regulation of managed funds an important 
area for continuing research. Secondly, the significant economic and social 
consequences of fund mergers and liquidations warrants a rethink of the current 
regulation. Thirdly, the continuing evolution of the managed funds industry requires 
regulation to be flexible. This thesis aims to provide insight into causes and 
implications of mergers and liquidation of managed funds from both a theoretical 
perspective and an empirical perspective, and in turn provides recommendations for 
regulating mergers and liquidations in Australia.  
 
Although survivorship has been studied by a number of papers, including Brown and 
Goetzmann (1995), Lunde, Timmermann and Blake (1999), Cameron and Hall 
(2003), Jayaraman, Khorana and Nelling (2002) and Khorana, Tufano and Wedge 
(2007), the focus is on the impact of survivorship bias on performance studies, and 
does not look into possible causes of fund termination and the impact of fund 
termination on investor fund selection. While many aspects of fund management, 
including performance measurement, performance persistence, survivorship bias, flow 
and performance relationship, fund size effect, family strategies and taxation effects 
have been investigated in the literature, it is evident that there is a gap in the literature 
concerning mergers and liquidations of managed funds. Further discussions are 
contained in Chapter 2. 
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 Figure 1.3 Timeline of Major Events in Australian Managed Funds Industry 
 
1936 Hugh Walton established Australian Fixed Trusts (AFT) 
and launched the First Australian Unit Trust 
Unit Trusts Ltd, the second-oldest management 
company, formed in Brisbane 
1938 
A M Parker founded Universal Flexible Trusts (UFT) 1955 
Ian Potter & Co launched the Australian Capital Fund, 
the first Australian US-style mutual fund 
1960 Total funds under management: A$50 million 
1965 Total funds under management: A$125 million 
1959 
Collapse of the Garretty group, biggest and most 
damaging in the 70’s 
1971 
Total funds under management: A$488 million 
1974 Largest stock market crash since 1929
1978 
1980 Hill Samuel launched the first Australian cash-
management trust (CMT) 
1983 AFT acquired by ANZ
1990 Estate Mortgage collapsed, thousands of investors went 
to court to retrieve their money 
1992 Property industry fund, Aust-Wide collapsed 
2000 Total funds under management: A$604 billion 
Total funds under management: A$1,066 billion 2006 
2008 Global Financial Crisis, collapse of a series of funds 
Sources: Mees, Wehner & Hanrahan 2005, Sykes 1995, Armstrong and Gross 1995, Clarke, Dean and 
Oliver 2003, Gallagher 2002 
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1.3 Thesis Contribution 
This thesis extends the body of literature on managed funds by investigating the 
mergers and liquidations of managed funds. The contributions of this thesis are 
fivefold. Firstly, the thesis develops a conceptual model to describe and summarise 
the causes of mergers and liquidations. The model describes two types of mergers, 
namely, strategic mergers and distressed mergers, as well as liquidations. Strategic 
mergers are driven by strategic decisions made by managed fund companies, such as 
exploiting economies of scale, reducing the number of duplicate products, removing 
legacy products and dealing with a shift in investor preference. Distressed mergers 
and liquidations are usually forced mergers and liquidations which may be initiated by 
the creditors or the court, or the fund may have triggered the provision for wind up 
under its own constitution. An important characteristic of strategic mergers, 
distinguishing them from distressed mergers and liquidations, is that they are usually 
supported by the majority of investors and do not result in financial distress. Indeed, 
sometimes investors may receive a better investment outcome from the merger.  
 
Secondly, the thesis extends the work of Lunde, Timmermann and Blake (1999) and 
Cameron and Hall (2003) by deriving and comparing the survival probabilities of 
managed funds in terms of individual fund categories. The survival probability of a 
managed fund is modelled as the probability of a fund surviving to a certain age for 
Australia, France and the UK. Examination of age distributions of terminated funds 
shows that funds that merge or liquidate generally do so at a young age. The Kaplan 
Meier estimator for survival functions is used to estimate probabilities of survival 
from historical data. It is found that survival probabilities deteriorate fast as the age of 
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 the fund grows, and the probability of a fund surviving past 10 years is around 50%. 
The log rank and Wilcoxon tests are used to test whether the survival functions of 
different categories of funds are statistically different, and it is found that there are 
differences in survival probabilities between different fund categories. In particular, 
allocation (balanced) funds have a higher probability of survival than alternative 
funds categories, which include hedge funds. 
 
The third contribution of the thesis is to identify factors that affect a fund’s probability 
of survival. This investigation extends prior work in this area (including Brown and 
Goetzmann 1995, Lunde, Timmermann and Blake 1999 and Cameron and Hall 2003) 
to include factors such as alpha, ranking within fund category, return skewness, fund 
size and fund family size. Cox regression results show that size is significant in that a 
larger fund is less likely to terminate. Also, funds with higher alpha, skewness and 
larger size are less likely to terminate.  Yet, funds in bigger families are more likely to 
terminate. Finally, while the survival models for Australia and France are quite 
similar, these differ somewhat from the UK models. These results provide additional 
considerations for investors when selecting managed funds. 
 
Fourthly, this thesis fills a much needed gap in the managed funds literature by 
investigating the determinants for the funds’ termination status, i.e. whether funds are 
merged or liquidated. This study is important for two reasons. Firstly, if mergers and 
liquidations exhibit distinctly different characteristics, further studies that involve 
non-surviving funds may need to separate out the two datasets. Secondly, this chapter 
provides indications for the areas that regulators could look at when designing policy. 
The results indicate that age is an important factor that distinguishes merged and 
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 liquidated funds, with merged funds on average older than liquidated funds. In 
addition, alpha, skewness and family size are important factors that impact the 
termination status in managed funds in UK or France. 
 
Finally, the focus of the thesis moves on from the causes of mergers and liquidations 
to implications of mergers and liquidations. Chapter 7 focuses on the problem of 
constructing the newly emerged products, master trusts, to mitigate the impacts of 
mergers and liquidation for managed fund investors. However, given that historical 
data on managed funds is limited due to fund births, mergers and liquidations, the 
problem of estimation error is particularly prominent when analysing master trusts. 
The Bayes-Stein estimation error adjustments for the mean and the covariance matrix 
adjustment put forward by Ledoit and Wolf (2003) are used to enhance weighting 
strategies for master trust construction. Data from 48 international indices are used to 
represent the returns earned on passively managed international index mutual funds. It 
is found that adjusting the covariance matrix for estimation error flattens the efficient 
frontier and shifts the minimum variance point to the right when compared with the 
more traditional methods and that minimum variance and adjusted mean-variance 
portfolios are the best performing weighting schemes 
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
To provide context for the research, Chapter 2 reviews the key academic literature on 
managed funds, starting with early research and then discussing a range of pertinent 
topics, and closing with a review of the literature on fund survivorship and relevant 
Australian literature. Chapter 3 provides an introductory discussion on mergers and 
liquidations of managed funds by discussing the legislative framework of mergers and 
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 liquidations, the process for liquidating and merging funds, the types of mergers and 
liquidation, and the implications of the different types of mergers and liquidation on 
the regulation of mergers and liquidation. The aim is to set the scene for the later 
chapters in the thesis. Chapter 4 first describes the primary source of data for this 
thesis, then analyses survival probabilities of managed funds in the three countries 
under study. Chapter 5 investigates factors that contribute to fund closure and predicts 
fund survival probabilities based on these factors. Drawing on results from Chapter 5, 
Chapter 6 studies the factors affecting the termination status of a fund, that is, whether 
a fund is merged or liquidated. Taking a some what different viewpoint, Chapter 7 
introduces master trusts as potential mitigants for the risk of mergers and liquidations, 
and investigates the impact of alternative weighting schemes on the performance of 
master trusts using various international equity market portfolios as proxies for 
passively managed international index funds.  This chapter specifically addresses the 
problem of estimation error in forming master trust portfolios. Finally, Chapter 8 
gives a summary of results of the thesis and discusses the limitations and future 
extensions to the work.  
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Chapter 2 Literature review 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Performance Evaluation 
Academic literature dealing with managed funds stretches back over several decades. 
The birth of the Modern Portfolio Theory and the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) led to the development of a number of performance measures widely used 
today, including the Sharpe ratio, Treynor Index, Jensen’s one factor alpha, Fama and 
French’s three factor alpha and Carhart’s four factor alpha. 
 
Pioneering research on managed funds dates back to the 1950’s. Markowitz laid the 
foundation stone for modern finance by developing Modern Portfolio Theory 
(Markowitz 1952). Modern Portfolio Theory suggests that rational investors base their 
investment decisions on finding the optimal trade-off between risk and expected 
return. In Modern Portfolio Theory, the risk of a portfolio is measured by the standard 
deviation of its returns, which is a statistical measure of the degree of fluctuation of a 
fund’s performance. As such, Modern Portfolio Theory has defined the two 
fundamental elements in any performance measure - expected return and risk, 
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 commonly measured by the mean and variance of historical returns, respectively. This 
mean-variance framework provides a theoretical explanation for the benefit of 
diversification. It suggests that by diversifying across assets that are not perfectly 
correlated, investors achieve higher expected returns without increasing risk (i.e. 
increase their opportunity set). 
 
Following Modern Portfolio Theory, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
created a different way of measuring risk (Treynor 1961, 1962, Sharpe 1964, Lintner 
1965, Mossin 1966). Instead of using standard deviation, this measures a fund’s 
sensitivity to market movements with a risk measure called beta. CAPM implicitly 
assumes that every investor holds a completely diversified portfolio, such that the 
unique returns for individual stocks tend to cancel out, leaving only non-diversifiable 
risk (also called systematic risk). Beta is calculated by regressing a fund’s excess 
return over a risk free investment against the excess returns earned from investment in 
a benchmark portfolio. 
 
Early articles on managed funds mainly focus on performance evaluation of 
individual funds. With the development of asset pricing theory including Modern 
Portfolio Theory and the Capital Asset Pricing Model, a number of well-known 
performance measures were developed. Sharpe (1966), Jensen (1968) and Treynor 
(1965) were among the first to develop these performance evaluation tools.  
 
Nobel Laureate William Sharpe (1966) developed a risk-adjusted measure for 
managed fund performance based on Modern Portfolio Theory. It measures the 
 22 
 portfolio’s return above the risk free rate (or excess return) per unit of risk, with risk 
measured by the standard deviation of the portfolio returns:   
 
Sharpe ratio = 
p
Fp RR
σ
−
 
where: 
 
PR  = the rate of return on the portfolio  
FR  = the rate of return on the risk-free asset (risk-free return), e.g. the average return 
of Treasury bills over the period 
Pσ  = the standard deviation of the portfolio 
The higher the Sharpe ratio, the better the portfolio’s risk-adjusted performance. As a 
simple “reward to variability” ratio, the Sharpe ratio is a popular tool used by 
investors to compare investment portfolios. 
 
The Treynor index developed by Treynor (1965) measures the excess return on the 
fund scaled by beta. In other words, it measures the difference between a portfolio’s 
actual return and the risk-free return per unit of risk as measured by beta, denoted pβ . 
Treynor Index = 
p
Fp RR
β
−
 
 
Jensen (1968) derived another popular performance measure based on CAPM. It is 
commonly named Jenson’s alpha, or the one factor alpha. It measures a fund’s ability 
to earn returns that are higher than that required under the CAPM model, given the 
level of risk (beta) of the portfolio (also called the equilibrium level of return). If the 
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 fund exceeds the expected return established by its beta, this would result in a positive 
alpha. The more positive the alpha, the better is the portfolio performance. The 
measure is based on the following CAPM equation: 
[ ]FMiFi RRERRE −=− )()( β  
and 
[ ]FMiFii RRERRE −−−= )()( βα  
where:  
iR  = the rate of return for fund i  
FR = the risk-free return  
MR = the rate of return on the market portfolio  
iα  = the constant in the regression equation 
iβ  = the slope in the regression equation 
ie  = the random error term 
In his paper, Jensen measured the performance of 115 managed funds in the period 
1945-1964 and found evidence that indicates fund managers on average are not able 
to outperform the market, and that the individual funds are unable to do significantly 
better than the market.  
 
Further extensions to the one factor alpha were later developed. The best known of 
these is the Fama and French three factor model (Fama and French 1992). The Fama 
and French three factor model suggests that two extra factors should be included in 
addition to the portfolio’s excess return on the market. They are, returns on factor 
mimicking portfolios for size named “Small Minus Big” (SMB) and returns on factor 
mimicking portfolios for book-to-market equity named “High Minus Low” (HML). 
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 Carhart (1997) presents a further extension adding an additional factor to the Fama 
and French model. He notes that in addition to the three factors, fund performance 
may be driven by a one-year momentum strategy, i.e. funds may benefit from holding 
larger positions in previous years’ winning stocks. As such, Carhart developed a four-
factor model incorporating a factor that mimics portfolios for one-year momentum in 
stock returns. Using a sample free of survivorship bias, Carhart found persistence in 
strongly under-performing funds and strongly over-performing funds, but the 
persistence only lasted one year. By including the fourth factor, a factor representing 
the momentum effects, the author found evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
persistence may be driven by one-year momentum effects. Finally, the author also 
found that fund expenses have a significant negative impact on fund returns in 
general.  
 
2.2 Managed funds: international evidence 
Asset pricing models and the performance assessment approaches derived from them 
formed the basis for a large quantity of literature focusing on performance persistence 
of managed funds, also known as the “hot hands” phenomenon. The literature on 
performance persistence investigates whether funds that perform well in the past 
continue to do so in the future or that funds that perform poorly in the past continue to 
perform poorly in the future. The results in the literature are mixed – with some 
studies supporting the hypothesis that performance persistence exists, and others 
rejecting its existence. Research supporting performance persistence includes the 
work of Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993), Goatzmann and Ibbotson (1994), 
Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1992), Carhart (1997), Brown and 
Goetzmann (1995), Malkiel (1995) and Elton and Gruber and Blake (1996). 
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An early empirical study of performance persistence is Hendricks, Patel, and 
Zeckhauser (1993). The authors measured the hot-hands phenomenon by calculating 
Jensen’s alpha for managed funds between 1974 to 1987. The results suggest that 
short term persistence (over 1 year horizon) exists for both good performers and 
underperformers, and that an investor could obtain a risk-adjusted return of 10% per 
year by capitalising on the hot hands phenomenon. Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) 
examined the performance of managed funds on a one-year and two-year basis and 
found that past returns and relative rankings are able to predict future performance. 
 
Further, Grinblatt and Titman (1993) introduced a performance test to measure the 
performance of managed funds using portfolio weights in the preceding period as a 
benchmark. Using this benchmark, they calculated alphas for 279 funds over the 
period between 1975 and 1984.  They divided the dataset into two sub-periods: 1975-
1979 and 1980-1984 to examine whether funds that performed well in the earlier 
period continued to do so in the later period. They also found evidence of 
performance persistence. 
 
Using a sample adjusted for survivorship bias between 1971 to 1991, Malkiel (1995) 
finds evidence of performance persistence during the 1970s but not in the 1980s, 
suggesting that the persistence pattern may be sensitive to the time period studied.  
Brown and Goetzmann (1995) shifted the focus from repeat-winners to repeat losers. 
Their results suggest that performance persistence is more likely due to repeat-losers 
than to repeat-winners. Perhaps the main implication from the performance 
persistence literature for investors is to be aware of those funds to avoid. 
 26 
  
Using risk-adjusted returns, Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996) investigated the 
persistence of managed fund performance using a 4-factor alpha. The 4 factors 
include the S&P index, a size index, a bond index and a value/growth index. The 
authors calculated a 1-year alpha and a 3-year alpha. They constructed a portfolio of 
high alpha, actively managed funds and found that it significantly outperformed the 
Vanguard S&P index fund. The Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996) study results in a 
number of findings. Firstly the authors find that prediction using one year’s past data 
gives greater persistence prediction than using three year’s data if performance is 
being predicted over a one-year period. Secondly, they find that raw returns give 
greater persistence prediction than risk-adjusted returns. Finally, they find that three 
year past returns are better when using risk adjusted returns.  
 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2002), in “Investing in Equity Mutual Funds”, argued that 
actively managed funds may be better substitutes for benchmark portfolios than 
existing passive funds, thus investing in active managed funds may be optimal even 
for investors who believe managers cannot outperform passive indexes. In a later 
paper “Mutual Fund Performance and Seemingly Unrelated Assets”, Pastor and 
Stambaugh found that standard performance measures such as alpha and the Sharpe 
ratio can be estimated more precisely using returns from assets not used to define 
those measures (seemingly unrelated assets), including a book-to-market factor and 
Carhart’s momentum factor. 
 
Gruber (1996) uncovered a puzzling fact that growth in actively managed funds 
remain strong even though they charge a higher fee and underperform passively 
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 managed index funds on average. Gruber also studied the “smart money” effect which 
suggests that investors will withdraw their investment from poor performing funds 
and put investments into better performing funds. 
  
There is mixed evidence for the “smart money” effect. Literature including Ippolito 
(1992), Goetzmann and Peles (1997), Gruber (1996), Zheng (1999) and others have 
reported that money flows into funds with high recent returns and flows out of poor 
past performers. On the other hand, Sirri and Tufano (1998) found that although 
investors competitively put money into good past performers, they fail to withdraw 
from poor past performers. 
 
More recently, Berk and Green (2004) present a theoretical model that predicts that 
superior fund management skills can be competed away by investors rationally 
shifting their money to managers with better skills. Thus, positive information on 
managerial ability will positively affect cash flows but this increase in cash flow 
could have a negative impact on mutul fund performance. Therefore, empirical 
evidence regarding whether funds that did well in the past tend to do well in the future 
is mixed. Although the general consensus in earlier studies indicate that investors may 
profit from the “hot hands” phenomenon. In recent empirical studies there is some 
evidence suggesting that performance may not persist as any superior fund 
management skills will be competitively traded away.  
 
More recent articles addressed a wide range of aspects in fund management, including 
market timing ability of managers, impact of fund size, fund styles, family strategies, 
and taxation implications. The effect of fund size on the performance of a fund is 
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 subject to a considerable amount of debate in the academic community. Some 
evidence suggests that larger funds outperform smaller funds (Gallagher and Martin, 
2005). On the other hand, there is evidence suggesting that a fund’s flexibility 
diminishes as the fund gets larger and this could restrict its performance. As such, 
funds can benefit by downsizing to reduce its price impact and benefit from lower 
transaction costs and administration costs (US literature include Beckers and 
Vaughan, 2001 Chen et al 2004, Droms and Walker, 1995 and Ciccotello and Grant, 
2001, Australian literature include Holmes and Faff, 2000 and Bilson, Frino and 
Heaney, 2004).  
 
Several studies have investigated the existence of optimal fund size and the impact of 
fund family strategies on investors. Perold and Salomon (1991) propose an optimal 
fund size model based on the marginal cost of additional growth. In their study on 
fund size, Elton et al (1993) point out that failure to include an index of firm size as a 
risk index can lead to a substantial overestimation in the performance of funds that 
hold small stocks and an incorrect average performance. Building on this argument, 
Indro et al (1999) suggest that too large a fund size can impede performance, thus 
funds should maintain an optimum fund size. The authors derived a non-linear model 
of the breakeven-cost fund size based on Perold and Salomon’s model to capture the 
relation between fund size and performance. The authors found an optimal fund size 
for the sample equal to approximately USD 1.0 billion. Also, from a sample of non 
indexed US equity funds over 1993-95, twenty percent of the funds were smaller than 
the breakeven-cost fund size.   
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 The work of Berk and Green (2004), with empirical support from analysis of 
Australian funds (Heaney, 2008), cast some doubt on over the optimal fund size 
proposition.   The existence of optimal fund size is queried by Berk and Green (2004) 
based on the argument that the level of management fees increases with the size of the 
fund and the ability of managers to create superior returns decreases with the size of 
the fund.  As such, Berk and Green (2004) suggest that each fund’s equilibrium fund 
size is determined by the skill of the manager and its cost function.  Further, Chen et 
al (2004) find that both before-fee and after-fee returns decline with lagged fund size. 
However, there is no negative relationship between fund family size and managed 
fund performance, suggesting that scale may not erode performance if the fund is well 
organised. 
 
A number of studies focus on how strategies of fund families affect fund performance. 
Massa (2003) argued that since fund families attract investors through both 
performance and diversification of the managed fund family, there is incentive for 
managers to focus on the performance of a fund family rather than just focusing on 
the performance of an individual fund. In particular, Massa (2003) used a sample 
from 1962 to 2000 and found that the higher the degree of product differentiation in a 
fund family, the less competitive the performance of its funds. The author suggests 
that the reason for this phenomenon may be that larger families are able to 
differentiate themselves by having a more diversified product range, and therefore 
have less need to compete in terms of performance. 
 
The impact of family strategy on fund performance has important implications for 
fund mergers and liquidations. Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) provide evidence 
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 that fund families may shift performance between their funds in order to maximise 
family performance, e.g. strategically allocating different Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs) to different funds in the family. Their results provide support for the argument 
bigger fund families (or families with higher product differentiation) could sacrifice 
individual fund performance in implementing family strategies. 
 
Also, some recent research investigates style and taxation effects on managed funds. 
Chan, Chen, and Lakonishok’s (2002) use Cahart’s four factor model to examine 
whether managed fund performance is dependent on the style of the fund. They find 
that after adjusting for style, there is evidence that growth managers on average 
outperform value managers. Furthermore, they find more evidence of style shifts in 
funds with poor past performance, in particular value-style managers were under 
pressure to shift to growth style strategies. 
 
It is apparent in the prior literature that funds with high pre-tax returns tend to attract 
greater cash inflows.  Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) examine the effect of tax and 
find that after-tax returns have more explanatory power than pre-tax returns in 
explaining inflows.  Further, it is apparent that a large overhang of unrealized capital 
gains discourages capital inflows. 
 
Research involving the survivorship of managed funds received attention in the 
academic literature soon after the early performance persistence studies. Much of the 
attention to managed fund survivorship evolves around the phenomenon of 
survivorship bias. The survivorship bias literature observes that ignoring non-
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 surviving funds in the study of fund performance persistence leads to upward biased 
returns. 
 
Brown et al (1992) were the first to demonstrate that survivorship bias has an upward 
effect on returns. Following this study, evidence of survivorship bias is provided in 
Gruber (1996), Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996), and Carhart et al (2002). For 
example, Carhart et al (2002) found that the effect of survivorship bias in average 
return is 0.07% annually for a one year sample period, and increases for longer 
sample periods. Malkiel (1995) also observed that managed fund return data were 
significantly influenced by survivorship bias during the 1980s and early 1990s, 
suggesting that the survivorship bias effect may also be dependent on the time period 
studied. 
 
2.3 Managed fund performance: Australian evidence 
Australian literature generally supports evidence found in the US for performance 
persistence and the smart money effect, as well as fund size and fund family effects 
on fund performance. Early Australian work by Robson (1986) found evidence 
supporting international evidence that managed funds lack the ability to achieve 
abnormal returns. Bird, Chin and McCrae (1983) then investigated Australian 
superannuation funds and their managers over the period from January 1973 to 1981, 
and found that Sharpe, Treynor and Jensen performance measures do not lead to much 
difference in the fund ranking. In addition, they found that poor performance for the 
first two and a half years of the study outweighed improved performance in the 
subsequent years, resulting in overall poor performance for the period studied. Lastly, 
they found little consistency in performance in their Australian sample. 
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Hallahan (1999) used a sample of Australian roll-over funds to study the information 
content of fund performance history for groups of funds. The dataset is divided into 
four categories: fixed interest, multi-sector yield, multi-sector balance and multi-
sector growth. Hallahan (1999) conducted performance persistence studies across the 
four categories and found that evidence of persistence differs between categories. In 
particular, fixed interest funds contain evidence of persistence, while multi-sector 
funds do not. 
 
Hallahan and Faff (2001) examined the selectivity and timing ability of Australian 
equity trusts on a sample of roll-over funds with the four categories in Hallahan 
(1999). Employing a contingency table methodology on the year-on-year raw return, 
their results showed that there is weak support for the hypothesis that funds have 
superior market timing ability. They also found that the four fund categories in the 
study had different rates of fund attrition. Although their sample showed some 
evidence of persistence, the dominant pattern was performance reversals. Following 
Hallahan and Faff (2001), Benson and Faff (2003) conducted a similar study on 
Australian International Equity Trusts and found no evidence of superior market 
timing ability by fund managers. 
 
Further evidence of the inability of funds to outperform market indices is provided by 
Sawicki and Ong (2000), who studied the performance of 97 Australian wholesale 
funds over the period 1983-1995 adopting a conditional performance evaluation 
methodology. 
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 Extending to fund categories other than domestic equities and bonds, Gallagher and 
Jarnecic (2004) analysed the performance of international equity trusts and found 
evidence supporting prior research which concludes that active management does not 
provide investors with superior returns to passive indices. Finally, Soucik and Allen 
(2006) studied the performance of Australian fixed interest trusts and found that the 
optimal benchmark for bond performance consists of a combination of fund-based 
market variable, a mixture of interest rate factors and economic factors, and a proxy 
for movements in the share market.  
 
2.4 Research relating to mergers and liquidations 
Although the current academic literature in the managed fund area lacks research that 
directly focuses on managed fund mergers and liquidations, there is research that 
focuses on areas relating to fund mergers and liquidations. These include Brown and 
Goetzmann (1995), Lunde, Timmermann and Blake (1999), Cameron and Hall 
(2003), Jayaraman, Khorana and Nelling (2002) and Khorana, Tufano and Wedge 
(2007). 
. 
Brown and Goetzmann (1995) focus on the determinants of managed fund survival 
probability by estimating a probit model based on US data. They found past 
performance was a significant determinant of fund closure, and that size and age were 
negatively correlated with fund closure.  It was also noted that the expense ratio was 
positively related to the probability of fund closure.  
 
Lunde, Timmermann and Blake(1999) examined a dataset of 973 dead funds and 
1402 surviving funds using survival analysis techniques including the Kaplan-Meier 
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 estimator and Cox regression.  Their Cox regression-based analysis identified past 
performance as being significantly correlated with fund closure.  In the most recent 
analysis on fund survival probabilities, Cameron and Hall (2003) applied survival 
analysis techniques to a fairly small sample of Australian equity trusts and found that 
while relative return offers a statistically significant explanation for fund closure, 
gross return did not. 
 
Jayaraman, Khorana and Nelling (2002) and Khorana, Tufano and Wedge (2007) 
researched the topic of managed fund mergers. Khorana, Tufano and Wedge (2007) 
found that the more independent the Board is, the more likely the fund would merge 
due to underperformance.  Jayaraman, Khorana and Nelling (2002) examined the 
determinants and shareholder wealth impact of managed fund mergers through 
comparing target and acquiring funds in terms of pre- and post-merger performance, 
turnover and expense ratios. Results indicate that target funds perform significantly 
worse than acquiring funds prior to merger and achieve significant improvement post-
merger. In addition, target firms are significantly smaller than acquiring firms. 
 
Master trusts and wraps have become increasingly popular investment products in 
recent years. According to Bowerman (2002), which quotes a market share report by 
Assirt, the master trust and wrap market size is $138 billion out of $661 billion from 
Assirt and RBA data, and the Australian master trust and wrap account market 
accounts for approximately 20% of the aggregate managed funds market. The main 
benefits of investing in master trusts include gaining access to wholesale funds, 
achieving diversification across different funds, consolidated reporting of all invested 
funds, and fee advantages (for example, the investment company may not impose 
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 entry or exit fees for transferring money around different funds, though some may 
charge a switching fee). Chapter 7 of this thesis will discuss the use of master trusts to 
mitigate the impacts of mergers and liquidation for managed fund investors. 
 
2.5 Summary 
In summary, many aspects of fund management, including performance measurement, 
performance persistence, survivorship bias, flow and performance relationship, fund 
size effect, family strategies and taxation effects have been investigated in the 
literature. It is evident that there is a gap in the literature concerning mergers and 
liquidations of managed funds. Although survivorship has been studied by a number 
of papers, they focus on the impact of survivorship bias on performance studies, and 
do not look into possible causes of fund termination and the impact of fund 
termination on investor fund selection. This thesis addresses this gap by providing an 
in depth analysis on the causes and consequences of managed fund mergers and 
liquidations. 
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Chapter 3 Managed funds mergers and liquidations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter provides an introductory discussion on mergers and liquidations of 
managed funds. This chapter discusses the legislative framework of mergers and 
liquidations, the process for liquidating and merging funds, the types of mergers and 
liquidation, and the implications of the different types of mergers and liquidation on 
the regulation of mergers and liquidation. The aim is to set the scene for the later 
chapters in the thesis. 
 
3.2 Brief Regulatory Background 
This section briefly discusses the regulatory background of Australian managed 
funds. In the late 1980s comprehensive failures across the unlisted property trusts 
sector brought mergers and liquidations of managed funds back into public attention. 
The slump also led to a couple of famous fund failures and fund mergers. (see Chapter 
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 1 discussions, Armstrong and Gross 1995, Clarke, Dean and Oliver 2003). The impact 
of these collapses led the Government to review the regulation of the managed funds 
industry. The Federal government began an inquiry in 1992 and a report was 
published subsequently (CAMAC 1993). The report introduced changes to 
Corporations Law including, but not limited to, enhancing the role for Australian 
Securities Commission (ASC) and auditors, obligation to disclose information, 
promoting a culture of compliance among scheme operators, and ensuring that 
investors can redeem interests only to the extent that the scheme has cash available to 
pay for them.  
 
The inquiry eventually led to the introduction of new legislation for the industry in 
July 1998. The Managed Investments Act 1998 (MIA) introduced a new Chapter 5C 
into the Corporations Law (now known as the Corporations Act 2001) governing the 
regulation of managed investment schemes. The most important change in the MIA 
was the introduction of the single responsible entity structure. Subsequently, the 
Financial Services Reform Act 2001 introduced further amendments to the 
Corporations Act to further regulate the managed funds industry, including: 
- a single licensing regime for financial sales, advice and dealings in relation to 
financial products; 
- mandatory disclosure for consistent and comparable financial product 
information  (e.g. mandating the Product Disclosure Statement); 
- regulation of sales and marketing practices. 
Managed funds are currently governed under the Corporations Act 2001. 
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3.3 Liquidation 
 
In Australia, liquidation provisions for registered managed investment schemes are set 
out in the Corporations Act 2001 (Corporations Act), under Part 5C.9 “Winding Up” 
which consists of Section 601NA to Section 601NG. Section 601NA to 601ND lists 
the circumstances under which a fund may be wound up. Section 601NE to Section 
601NG set out the procedures for winding up a fund. Managed investment schemes 
are regulated by Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). As such, 
managed fund liquidations must be lodged with ASIC (Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission 2008). 
 
There are three types of liquidation– member’s voluntary liquidation, creditors’ 
voluntary liquidation & court liquidation. Liquidation can be initiated by the 
investment company, the shareholders, the creditors or the court. The legislation 
provides that a registered managed investment scheme may be wound up in one of the 
following circumstances: 
 
1) The winding up is required by the scheme’s constitution 
The fund’s Constitution may make provision for winding up the fund at a specified 
time or in specified circumstances. As a consequence, the fund may be liquidated if it 
satisfies provisions in the scheme's constitution. The Constitution could also specify 
that the scheme is to be wound up on the happening of a specified event and that time 
is reached, those circumstances occur or that event occurs. An example of a wind up 
of this type would be a provision in the Product Disclosure Statement of a managed 
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 fund specifying that the fund is to be wound up if total assets fall under, say, $2 
million.  
 
2) At the direction of its members 
The members may pass an extraordinary resolution directing the responsible entity 
(i.e. the Investment Company) to wind up the scheme. It should be noted that the 
members also have the power to pass a resolution removing the responsible entity but 
do not, at the same meeting, pass a resolution choosing a company to be the new 
responsible entity that consents to becoming the scheme's responsible entity.  
 
3) The scheme’s purpose is accomplished or cannot be accomplished 
The responsible entity initiates a wind up and requests that the members vote for the 
proposal. This is the most common type of liquidation. An example of wind up under 
this circumstance is the liquidation of the MFS cash enhanced fund in 2008, which 
was initiated by the investment company with a “Notice of Intention to wind up 
scheme” sent to the investors stating that the fund is unable to accomplish the purpose 
of the scheme, as it is unable to provide a return that exceeds the performance 
benchmark, which led to withdrawal of the majority of unit holders. 
 
4) An order is made by the court 
Under this circumstance, the Court makes an order directing the responsible entity to 
wind up the scheme. The court order could be initiated by the financial services 
watchdog ASIC, which may obtain orders from the Court to wind up the scheme and 
appoint a liquidator to the company. This type of liquidation may happen if the 
responsible entity fails to comply with their obligations under the law, or if a 
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 company raises funds from investors, but is not registered as a managed investment 
scheme. ASIC’s website provides a record of the funds wound up by court order. 
 
Procedure of liquidation:  
If the investment company initiates the liquidation, the investment company first 
sends a proposal for winding up to the scheme members. This proposal is called 
“Notice of intention to wind up scheme pursuant to section 601NC of the 
Corporations Act 2001”. Members have a right under the Act to take action and call a 
members’ meeting to consider the proposed winding up and to vote on any 
extraordinary resolution that the members propose about the winding up of the 
scheme. A meeting is called only if members with at least 5% of votes or at least 100 
voting members request the meeting. 
 
If insufficient members request a meeting within the 28 day period, the responsible 
entity may proceed to wind up the scheme. The responsible entity of a registered 
scheme must ensure that the scheme is wound up in accordance with its constitution 
and any orders under subsection 601NF(2). 
 
To wind up the scheme, a liquidator is appointed to collect and realize the assets of 
the scheme, and then pay from the scheme assets all outstanding creditors, and 
distribute the net proceeds of realization of the scheme’s assets to the members pro 
rata in accordance with the proportion of units held by them.3 
 
                                                 
3 See Australian Securities and Investments Commission 2008, Liquidation: a guide for creditors, 
December.  
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 Similar winding up provisions are present in other jurisdictions, for example, in the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 of the United States (US), Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) handbook (Collective Investment Schemes Sourcebook) of the 
United Kingdom, and the Securities Act (section 261, paragraph 3) of France. 
 
3.4 Mergers 
There is currently no provision for merger of managed funds in Australia. To merge, 
the target fund has to first go through the liquidation procedure as documented in 
section 3.2, then purchase units in the acquiring fund. Under the current tax law, 
capital gains tax would be realized on the sale of units in the fund, though the 
acquiring company may deduct any fees incurred by investors to facilitate the merger. 
This process is complex and time consuming, and the merger may not succeed if 
certain individual investors are not willing to transfer to the new fund even if the new 
fund offers a better deal. Consequently, the Australian Treasury is currently proposing 
to amend legislation to facilitate mergers of managed funds in Australia. Their 
proposal and findings are documented in the “Product Rationalisation” issues paper 
published on their website (The Treasury 2007). 
 
Unlike managed funds, superannuation funds are allowed to merge under Part 18 of 
the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act 1993 (the SIS Act). A merger may 
occur if the members consent to transferring withdrawal benefits to another fund or 
another product within the fund. Alternatively, member consent is not required if the 
trustee transfers beneficiary withdrawal benefits to an Eligible Rollover Fund or a 
successor fund. Section 144 of the SIS Act provides that benefits may be transferred 
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 to a new fund with the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA)’s 
approval. 
 
Mergers of managed funds are allowed in other developed economies. Since 1980, the 
US has permitted mergers of funds, with merger provisions in the Investment 
Company Act of 1940.  A provision in the Act places responsibility on the board of 
directors of the managed fund company to ensure that mergers are conducted in the 
best interests of the shareholders of the merging company (who are in effect the 
beneficiaries of the fund).  
 
In most cases US legislation requires majority shareholder approval for mergers 
between registered investment funds. However, a merger may proceed without the 
approval of shareholders, subject to certain conditions being met (The Treasury 2007, 
p.20). For instance, section 17 of the Investment Company Act was amended in 2002 
to allow mergers of funds within the same fund complex without the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC, regulator of US financial sector) issuing an order of 
exemption (Securities and Exchange Commission 2002). 
 
In the UK, liquidations and mergers of managed investment schemes are regulated by 
the rules made by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) under powers given to the 
FSA by Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The Handbook published by the 
FSA sets out the rules made by the FSA. The Handbook provides for merger subject 
to unit holder approval and termination subject to FSA approval (Financial Services 
Authority 2009). All UK mergers require approval from the FSA and unit holders of 
the terminating fund. Nonetheless, approval from members of the continuing fund 
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 may be avoided if the merger is unlikely to result in any material detriment to these 
members, is consistent with the objectives of the fund, and will not breach the FSA’s 
rules. It is worth noting that the numbers required to form a quorum for the votes can 
be very low. Generally, a quorum can be formed with at least two shareholders 
present at the extraordinary general meeting (EGM) or proxy forms returned covering 
at least 5 per cent of the shares on issue. The merger proposal is passed if at least 75 
per cent of the votes cast in favour of the change. 
 
As mentioned above, the Australian legislative framework for managed fund mergers 
is currently being reviewed by the Australian Commonwealth Treasury. The Treasury 
has passed a “Product Rationalisation” Issues Paper released for comment on 22 June 
2007 (The Treasury 2007). The issues paper proposes amending the legislation to 
allow “product rationalisation” in managed investment schemes, superannuation 
funds and life insurance products. Note that “product rationalisation” is a term 
referring to a mechanism for removing outdated products by transferring customers 
out of these products and into new products. 
 
The Treasury has received twenty submissions in response to the issues paper, mostly 
from the financial services sector, including representatives of wholesale and retail 
funds, the Investment and Financial Services Association Limited (IFSA) and the 
representative of superannuation funds, the Association of Superannuation Funds of 
Australia Limited (ASFA). The general consensus of the submissions from the 
financial services sector (e.g. ASFA, IFSA, Mercer, etc) are that rationalisation should 
be available on an ongoing basis, there should be compulsory transfer of members to 
the new fund, there should be a “no detriment” test for determining any detriment to 
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 the investors from the merger and that there is no need to provide investors with a 
right to object to rationalization proposals, as financial services providers have an 
obligation to act in the best interests of investors.  
 
Nonetheless, some institutions, including the Institute of Actuaries of Australia and 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers believe that investors should have the right to object to a 
merger (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2007). In addition, Macquarie Bank argues that 
capital gains tax relief should be available for an investor moving from a higher cost 
fund to a lower cost fund, given that the both funds have the same manager, 
investment strategy, investment objective, benchmark index, and substantially the 
same weighting of assets and investor terms (Macquarie Financial Service Group 
2007).  
 
3.5 Causes of Mergers and Liquidations 
This section presents and discusses a framework for conceptualising the causes of 
managed fund mergers and liquidations. The framework, as presented in Figure 3.1, 
groups the causes of managed fund terminations into two broad categories. The first 
category is called strategic merger, and the second category is called distressed 
mergers and liquidations. The following subsections discuss each category in detail.  
 
3.5.1 Strategic Mergers 
The first type of merger is driven by strategic decision making of managed fund 
companies. The reasons for making these strategic decisions include, as discussed in 
the followings sub-sections, the desire to achieve economies of scale, reduce the 
number of duplicate products, remove legacy products and adjust for shift in investor  
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Figure 3.1 Conceptualizing Strategic Merger, Distressed Merger and Liquidation 
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preference. An important characteristic of these mergers, that distinguishes them from 
distressed mergers and liquidations, is that they are usually supported by the majority 
of investors and do not cause financial distress. Indeed, sometimes investors may 
receive a better investment outcome from the merger. 
 
3.5.1.1 Economies of scale 
 
The most common cause of merger is motivated by the desire to achieve a more 
efficient structure in the management of fund operations. By expanding the scale of 
operations, a fund may reduce operating costs, achieve greater buying power, and/or 
become more resistant to redemptions and market downturns. 
 
Evidence of economies of scale resulting from fund mergers is presented in 
Jayaraman, Khorana and Nelling (2002). The authors find that the performance of 
target funds improves after the mergers (although the returns of acquiring funds are 
compromised after the mergers). They also find that funds with higher expense ratios 
are more likely to be acquired and achieve a reduction in expense ratios after the 
merger. Jayaraman, Khorana and Nelling (2002)’s findings were quoted in Securities 
and Exchange Commission’s rule amendment in 2003 allowing freer fund merger 
activities in the US. 
 
Advantages from fund mergers are also documented in the European Commission’s 
cross-border merger green paper, which argues the case for cross-border merger of 
managed funds in the European Union (EU). It states that hurdles to the circulation of 
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 investment funds within the EU make investors fragmented and biased toward 
national products. Market fragmentation has led to a proliferation of funds. These 
often have suboptimal size (5 times smaller than the average size of US mutual funds, 
ICI and FEFSI data as at Dec 2004) which impedes fund managers and administrators 
from properly benefiting from pooled investment. This also translates to higher costs 
for investors. 
 
Concentration of the Australian market increased over recent years with mergers and 
acquisitions in the industry (Gallagher 2002). To name a few, Commonwealth Bank 
and Colonial Group, AMP and GIO Australia, National Australian Bank and MLC, 
BNP Paribas Investment Management and Massachusetts Financial Services (MFS), 
ING Investment Management and ANZ Funds Management, Westpac Financial 
Services and BT Financial Group, Alliance Capital Management and AXA Asia-
Pacific were all prominent mergers or acquisitions in the last 10 years. 
 
3.5.1.2 Duplicate products  
 
Mergers may be initiated to reduce the number of funds that serve the same, or 
similar, purposes. The fact that duplicate products exist within an investment 
company could be due to merger and acquisition activities between investment 
companies creating duplicate lines of business. Alternatively, companies tend to 
launch specialized trusts in bull markets to tap into new markets.  In bear markets, 
there is a tendency to remove funds that are not performing as well, thus combining 
them with funds with similar objectives (see Bogle 2005 and Lowenstein 2008). 
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 According to data collected from Morningstar, the number of funds in Australia 
soared from about 400 in the early 1990’s to over 3300 today. With about 200 fund 
management firms, the number of funds managed by each firm is unevenly 
distributed. Some 75 firms manage only one fund, and about 10 firms manage over 
100 funds. In particular, large firms such as Skandia and Colonial First State have 
more than 400 funds under management. This makes the average size of a fund family 
in Australia approximately 180 funds. The ability to merge duplicate products could 
be a sought after legal power for investment companies. 
 
There are disadvantages to having such a vast selection of funds, according to Bogle 
(2005) and Lowenstein (2008), as this makes selecting a managed fund as difficult as 
selecting a company to invest in. Specifically, in his book boldly named “The 
Investors’ Dilemma: How mutual funds are betraying your trust and what to do about 
it”, Lowenstein argues that:  
Mutual funds now operate much like Unilever (the soap company). 
The fund complexes are not simply satisfying our requirements, they 
are creating them – products with consistent standards, and 
recognizable brands that provide the buyer with a sense of comfort … 
Which fund should you buy within the family of funds? It doesn’t 
really matter to the company; that’s why they continually add new 
products, whether distinct from one another or not. (Lowenstein 2006, 
p. 121) 
Lowenstein’s observations reinforce the importance of studying the causes and 
consequences of managed fund mergers and liquidations. 
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 3.5.1.3 Legacy products  
 
Legacy products are defined as financial products that are closed to new investors but 
remain in operation because there are still investors in this product (The Treasury 
2007, p.5). Legacy products may arise due to legislative change or technological 
trends.  
 
Changes in government policies and legislation impact investment choices and cause 
investment products to become outdated. Examples of such events include changes in 
tax law, changes in superannuation policy, amendments in social security rules, and 
changes in pension law. 
 
Continued improvement in computing and internet data transfer also creates legacy 
products. These may arise where the legacy products run on computer systems built 
on older technology. Over time, staff administering these products progressively  
retire and it is costly to train new staff on legacy programming languages. In addition, 
hardware may no longer be able to be maintained and the cost of replacement is high. 
As a consequence legacy products become relatively costly to maintain.4 
 
The emergence of the internet allows fund companies to sell their products without 
having to develop costly local distribution networks. The internet is increasingly used 
by investors not only as a source of information but also to directly purchase units in 
investment funds. This is likely to become the main driver of legacy product mergers 
in the future (European Commission 2005, 2006). 
                                                 
4 See The Treasury (2007) and related submissions. 
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3.5.1.4 Market Trend 
 
Mergers may occur because of investor preference shifts. For instance, a type of asset 
may become unpopular among investors and thus is no longer able to attract new 
investments. The investment company may decide to merge such funds into a fund 
with a different objective. This type of merger is more difficult to achieve as it usually 
requires changing the investment policy of the fund. Thus, the investment company 
must convey a convincing case to the investors to obtain their support.  
 
An example of such a merger happened in 2004, when the market trend was moving 
away from split capital investment trusts, with many of these funds being wound up. 
A fund manager in the UK changed a fund that is investing in the income shares of 
split capital investment trusts to 60 per cent in bonds and 40 per cent in equities. 
There were 35 per cent of the shareholders who lodged a merger vote, with 99 per 
cent in favour of the change (BNET Australia 2004). However, it is common for 
investors to vote against a merger even when the performance of the terminating fund 
has been poor. 
 
 
3.5.1.5 Summary 
 
Strategic mergers are driven by management consideration of the investment 
company. Investor consent for these mergers is relatively easy to achieve, as they are 
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 mostly advantageous for investors relative to staying in the terminating fund. Strategic 
mergers should not cause financial distress for investors, but their benefits are 
dependent on whether the legislative framework facilitates these mergers (e.g. tax law 
allowing merger with no incurrence of capital gains tax for the investors). It would 
appear that strategic mergers are an inevitable part of operations, and in turn should 
be allowed from a governance point of view. 
 
3.5.2 Distressed Merger & Liquidation 
 
As opposed to the discretionary nature of strategic mergers, distressed mergers are 
usually forced mergers. They may be initiated by the creditors or the court, or the 
fund may have triggered the provision for wind up through its own constitution. 
 
3.5.2.1 Underperformance and Redemptions 
Funds may achieve consistently low returns and thus lead to the exit of major 
investors. In these cases the investment company may merge the poorly performing 
fund into a better performing fund within the same company, or sell the fund to 
another company, or in the worst case liquidate the fund. 
 
Fund liquidations surge during financial market downturns. Figure 3.2 shows that 
from 1988, there are 55 funds, or 4% of funds failing on average per year in Australia. 
In particular, there are spikes in the number of dead funds during economic 
downturns, such as the 1991-1992 recession, the 2001-2002 economic downturn, and 
the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. 
 
 52 
 Figure 3.2 Number of Failed Funds per Year Plotted Against the Total Number 
of Funds per Year 
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As discussed in Chapter 1, during 1989 to 1992 the managed funds industry 
experienced wide-scale liquidations, particularly distressed mergers of unlisted 
property trusts. Major collapses include AustWide and Estate Mortgage, and major 
mergers include Brick merging into National Mutual, and Equitable merging into 
Lend Lease and GPT. These collapses shocked the industry as well as regulators, and 
eventually led to the 1998 legislative reform of the managed funds industry. 
 
During the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis a large number of funds were wound 
up or redemptions were frozen to prevent going into liquidation. The pessimistic 
outlook was reflected in an article on 16 October 2008 (Smart Company 2008), which 
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 warned that “One in five managed funds may not survive the crunch”. In fact, a series 
of prominent funds were wound up during the 2008 bear market, including Octaviar 
Limited’s (formerly MFS Limited) MFS cash enhanced fund, which liquidated due to 
inability to provide returns that exceed the performance benchmark and the 
redemption of the majority of unit holders.5 Also liquidated during the 2008 financial 
crisis were Basis Capital, EQT Lehman Brothers Wholesale High Income Fund and 
City Pacific. Hedge funds and property funds proved to be the most vulnerable in the 
2008-2009 bear market. 
 
It should be noted that not only underperforming funds face redemptions during bear 
markets, some good funds face redemptions as the investors (fund of funds, manager 
of managers) face redemptions themselves.  
 
Short-term horizon focused 
A major contributor to fund underperformance during turbulent economic conditions 
is investment strategy. A typical investment horizon for a managed fund investor 
spans at least several years (Allen, Brailsford, Bird & Faff 2003). But it is often said 
that fund managers are too focused on short-term performance (for example, The 
Treasury 2007). 
 
The marketing of funds is primarily focused on short term past performance. 
Magazines and brochures mostly present fund performance tables on 1 year, 3 year 
and 5 year return performance. This coverage has the advantage of enhancing 
manager competitiveness in performance, but it also has created a downside effect. 
                                                 
5 See Octaviar Limited 2008, MFS Cash Enhanced Fund: Notice of intention to wind up scheme 
pursuant to section 601NC of the Corporations Act 2001, 28 March.  
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 That is, investors competitively increase their investment in the best-performing 
funds, creating incentives for managers to enhance their short-term performance by 
closing down poor-performing funds. This effect intensifies the potential for mergers 
and liquidations of funds. 
 
 
3.5.2.2 Risk Taking 
Risk taking behaviour of a managed fund appears in several different aspects, namely, 
tilting towards riskier asset classes, undertaking speculative trading strategies, or 
having excessive leverage. 
 
1) Tilt towards riskier asset classes 
Some managed funds chase high yields by placing a large proportion of assets in 
riskier asset classes. A recent example is the failure of Basis Capital's Basis Yield 
Alpha Fund which invested mainly in Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) during 
the 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis when CDOs failed badly. The fund faces losses 
of more than 80% (Gettler and Burrow 2007). Even if the fund does not borrow, 
losses beyond the initial capital outlay can occur through instruments such as 
instalment receipts or contracts for difference. 
 
Australian superannuation funds seem to have had a bias toward equities in their 
portfolios. Before the global financial crisis in 2008, Australian superannuation funds 
had around 57% invested in equities, compared with an average of 36% in 20 OECD 
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 countries where data is available.6 A bias towards riskier asset classes makes funds 
more vulnerable to market downturns. 
 
2) Speculative trading strategies 
Speculative trading strategies are usually engaged in by hedge funds. Some hedge 
fund strategies are based on speculation about the direction of currencies, 
commodities, equities and fixed interest and on spot or futures markets across the 
globe. Strategies such as systematic trading (automatic investment decisions to exploit 
a trend or pattern) or discretionary trading (concentrated positions held for a very 
short period of time) are highly speculative. 
 
Across the board, an increase in speculation by fund managers is indicated by the 
soaring turn-over of fund investment in recent years. As documented by both Bogle 
(2005) and Lowenstein (2007), some funds hold a large number of stocks selected by 
computer programs rather than by field work (visiting companies in person) and 
fundamental analysis, indicating that they are being less selective in their holdings. 
Lowenstein (2008) further quotes a study by Financial Research Corporation (FRC) 
that shows financial advisers have been spending less effort on analysing stocks either 
individually or within a fund, relative to the effort spent on marketing and attracting 
new investments. Poorly selected investments holdings could lead to the funds being 
vulnerable in market downturn.  
 
 
 
                                                 
6 See The Australian Government 2009, Governance - Issues Paper, Review into the governance, 
efficiency, structure and operation of Australia’s superannuation system, August. 
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 3) Leverage 
Leveraging is a strategy sometimes used in managed funds (particularly hedge funds) 
to increase the size of their market positions in excess of invested capital. Leverage 
has the effect of magnifying the risk taken in speculative positions. A 1990’s 
Australian Commonwealth Treasury issues paper “Liability of Members of Managed 
Investment Schemes” identified the increasing tendency for managed investment 
schemes to borrow funds against scheme assets.7 
 
Leverage may be obtained by borrowing against assets, short selling or using 
derivatives.  Van Hedge Fund Advisors tracked hedge funds globally as at the end of 
2003, and measured their balance sheet leverage as the sum of total long and short 
positions on the balance sheet divided by total capital, excluding off-balance sheet 
leverage from derivatives. Approximately 70 per cent of managers surveyed had 
leverage, with 40 per cent reporting balance-sheet leverage less than 200%, and 30 
per cent greater than 200%. Such high leverage could lead to liabilities in excess of 
investment. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
The first part of the chapter discussed the legislative framework for mergers and 
liquidations.  Liquidation provisions are set out in Corporations Act. Liquidation may 
be initiated by the investment company, the fund members, the fund’s creditors or the 
court. However, currently there are no merger provisions in Australia, and the 
Commonwealth Treasury is considering introducing mechanism for product 
                                                 
7 See Companies and Securities Advisory Committee 2000, Report to the minister for Financial 
Services and Regulation on Liability of Members of Managed Investment Schemes, March. 
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 rationalisation in managed funds, superannuation and insurance products. Note that 
mergers are allowed in some other jurisdictions. 
 
The second part of the chapter discussed different types of mergers and liquidations, 
namely strategic mergers, distressed mergers and liquidations. The implications for 
the regulator are also discussed. It is noted that regulation should achieve a balance 
between efficiency and investor protection.  
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Chapter 4 Survival Probabilities of Managed Funds 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Managed funds’ mergers and liquidation activities are inevitable. They may happen to 
exploit economies of scale or clean out duplicate funds; funds may grow outdated and 
eventually become legacy funds; economic downturn may wash out underperforming 
funds. In fact, as discussed in Chapter 3, mergers and liquidations happen for a variety 
of reasons. As such, the survival probability of a managed fund is an important 
research topic. How likely is it for a fund to survive past a certain age, say 5 years or 
10 years? Is there any difference in the survival prospects of different categories of 
funds? This Chapter investigates the survival probabilities of managed funds. The 
fund’s age-at-termination is represented by a continuous random variable T . The 
survival probabilities of a managed fund are represented by the survival function 
. For any positive t ,  is the probability of a new fund attaining age t .  )(tS )(tS
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 Using a comprehensive dataset provided by Morningstar, this chapter investigates the 
survival probabilities of Australian, French and UK managed funds.  Managed funds 
are divided into two groups – the “surviving funds” group are those that are alive as at 
the end of June 2008, and the “terminated funds” group are those that are merged or 
liquidated before the end of June 2008. The terminated funds include strategic 
mergers, distressed mergers and liquidations. 
 
The critical problem with estimating survival probabilities using data from a fixed 
time period is the “right-censored” data problem.  This occurs because there are a 
number of funds in existence at the end of the study period that will merge or 
liquidate at some time in the future though there is no way of determining which will 
merge or liquidate.  In this analysis the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier survival 
estimator (Kaplan and Meier 1958) is used to specifically adjust for the right-censored 
data problem. The Kaplan-Meier estimator requires no assumptions regarding the 
underlying distribution of the survival probabilities. 
 
This chapter firstly develops a model of the life of a managed fund, then goes on to 
describe the application of the Kaplan-Meier survival estimator to the analysis of fund 
survivorship. It then derives the Kaplan-Meier survival functions using Australian, 
French and the UK data and compares the survival functions estimated for the three 
different countries as well as for different fund categories within these countries. 
 
This study differs from Lunde, Timmermann and Blake (1999) and Cameron and Hall 
(2003) in two ways. Firstly, this study extends to fund categories outside equity funds 
to include allocation, fixed income, money market and alternative funds. Secondly, 
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 this study compares the survival probabilities between fund categories to examine 
whether fund category impacts on the survival probability of managed funds. 
 
4.2 Data 
Data on managed funds in Australia, France and the UK were collected from 
Morningstar. Data collected for each fund include category, inception date, obsolete 
type (merged or liquidated) and obsolete date. These are: 
• 4505 Australian funds, including 2730 equity funds, 833 fixed income funds 
and 939 allocation funds. Note Morningstar does not provide alternative funds 
or money market funds data for the Australian sample. 
• 6374 French Funds, including 1899 equity funds, 971 fixed income funds, 760 
money market funds 930 allocation funds, and 1346 alternative funds. 
• 4860 UK funds, including 2693 equity funds, 786 fixed income funds, 71 
money market funds 458 allocation funds, and 131 alternative funds. 
Note that hedge funds are included in the alternative funds category. None of the 
country samples include superannuation funds due to the difference in legislation for 
superannuation funds as discussed earlier in the thesis.  
 
Table 4.1 shows the number of funds born and the number of funds terminated during 
each financial year from 1 July 1974 to 30 June 2008 as well as the number of funds 
alive at the end of each year. The number of funds created each year has significantly 
increased in recent years, along with the number of funds terminated.  
 
An important feature of our managed funds dataset is the large number of funds that 
are still alive at the end of the investigation period. Although the exact time of fund 
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 merger or liquidation is not observed, this data is useful for constructing the survival 
function estimate because it indicates that these funds have survived at the time of 
censoring. We analyse this dataset using a survival analysis method that handles such 
“right censored” data – the Kaplan-Meier estimator, which is a technique commonly 
used in biostatistics for analysing the effectiveness of medical treatments for patients.  
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 Table 4.1 Fund Births and Terminations over Time 
Year Australia France The UK 
 Born Term-inated Alive Born 
Term-
inated Alive Born 
Term-
inated Alive 
1974 4  20 3  58 23  160 
1975 0  20 1  59 5  165 
1976 5  25 0  59 7  172 
1977 0  25 1  60 0  172 
1978 3  28 6  66 7  179 
1979 3  31 26  92 6  185 
1980 3  34 14  106 15  200 
1981 15  49 16  122 48  248 
1982 19  68 21  143 12  260 
1983 30  98 35  178 21  281 
1984 40  138 56  234 47  328 
1985 44  182 191  425 92  420 
1986 66  248 120  545 89  509 
1987 77  325 127  672 80  589 
1988 89 4 410 132  804 66 2 653 
1989 57 33 434 175  979 102 0 755 
1990 64 39 459 153  1132 52 1 806 
1991 35 32 462 170  1302 47 0 853 
1992 60 58 464 176 1 1477 73 0 926 
1993 125 42 547 129 1 1605 56 0 982 
1994 95 19 623 137 0 1742 88 0 1070 
1995 91 38 676 158 0 1900 113 0 1183 
1996 152 32 796 212 0 2112 65 0 1248 
1997 170 31 935 300 0 2412 97 0 1345 
1998 201 56 1080 329 0 2741 153 0 1498 
1999 245 70 1255 320 0 3061 265 0 1763 
2000 182 83 1354 489 2 3548 893 2 2654 
2001 405 71 1688 397 174 3771 236 26 2864 
2002 332 104 1916 448 292 3927 261 120 3005 
2003 481 192 2205 380 359 3948 202 296 2911 
2004 297 53 2449 378 305 4021 221 228 2904 
2005 549 66 2932 393 357 4057 285 149 3040 
2006 186 99 3019 359 266 4150 298 117 3221 
2007 288 23 3284 291 403 4038 409 199 3431 
2008 76 17 3343 122 213 3947 214 182 3463 
Born = number of funds born during year 
Terminated = number of funds merged or liquidated during year 
Alive = number of funds alive at end of year  
Data as at June 2008, funds alive at end of June 2008 are treated as censored lives 
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 4.3 Age Distribution of Terminated Funds 
This section analyses the age at which funds merge or liquidate using histograms. In 
Australia a total of 1162 funds terminated during the study period and their age 
distribution at time of termination is summarised in Figure 4.1. 
 
Out of the funds that terminated prior to the end of the study period, 4% of funds 
terminated before the age of 12 months. The majority of funds (52%) terminated 
between the age of 12 months (1 year) and 60 months (5 years). 42% of funds 
terminated between the age of 60 months (5 years) and 240 months (20 years). Only 
2% of funds survived past the age of 20 years. 
 
Panel B of Figure 4.1 shows a histogram of the ages at which the funds terminated for 
all of the funds that merged and liquidated in the French sample. The French funds 
generally merge or liquidate at an older age than Australian funds. Out of 2373 
French funds that merge or liquidate during the sample period, 2% merge or liquidate 
within 1 year, 29% merge or liquidate between 1 to 5 years old, and the majority 
(65%) merge or liquidate between 5 to 20 years old. Only 4% of those terminated 
survive past 20 years. 
 
In the UK, funds merge or liquidate at an older age compared to both France and 
Australia. As shown in Figure 3.4, out of the 1322 UK funds that terminated, only 
0.5% merge or liquidate within 1 year, 32% merge or liquidate between 1 to 5 years 
old, and 59% merge or liquidate between 5 to 20 years old. A higher percentage of 
funds, i.e.10%, survive past 20 years. 
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 Figure 4.1 Age Distributions of Terminated Funds 
Panel A: Australia
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Panel B: France
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 Panel C: United Kingdom
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4.4 Kaplan-Meier Estimator of Fund Survival 
This section describes a model of the life of a fund. Let T represent the age that the 
fund merger or liquidation occurs. T is assumed to have a continuous distribution. 
Survival time refers to the number of months from the birth of the fund to fund 
merger or liquidation.  
 
To quantify the random behaviour of T, let the survival distribution  
represent the probability that the fund survives past time t, 
)()( tTPtST >=
1)0( =TS . The hazard 
function represents the instantaneous risk of fund merger or liquidation just past time 
t, given that the fund has survived until time t, and is represented by: 
t
)tT|ttTt(Plim)t(h
0t Δ
≥Δ+≤≤= →Δ     (1) 
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The cumulative distribution )()( tTPtFT ≤=  is the probability that the fund merges 
or liquidates by age t. The probability density function )()()t( tFtSf ′=′−= , where 
 is approximately the probability of merger or liquidation in the interval 
. 
tf Δ)t(
),( ttt Δ+
 
The fundamental connection between the hazard function and the survival function is 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−= ∫t TT dyyhtS
0
)(exp)(  
where is called the integrated hazard function and is the amount of hazard 
that a fund has accumulated by time t. 
∫t T dyyh
0
)(
 
The censored observations in our dataset are right-censored observations. They 
indicate that the fund has survived past a certain age. This information, along with the 
information on time of mergers and liquidations from the observed events, is used to 
construct the maximum likelihood estimate for survival functions.  
 
Let the total number of funds in the dataset be denoted by N, out of these N funds, m 
funds have observed mergers and liquidations and N - m are censored. Let 
be the ordered times at which mergers and liquidations were observed, 
assume  as some mergers and liquidations may occur at the same time. Suppose 
 ( ) funds are censored between  and , where 
J21 t...tt <<<
mJ ≤
jc Jj1 ≤≤ jt 1jt + 0t 0 = and , this ∞=+1Jt
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 permits funds to be censored after the last observed merger or liquidation time. The 
censored times in the interval ( )1jj t,t +  are denoted by . jjcj2j1 t,...,t,t
 
This non-parametric Kaplan-Meier survival estimator uses the times at which 
observed fund mergers and liquidations occur and the censoring times to construct a 
maximum likelihood function of the survival probabilities. The likelihood function is 
constructed by multiplying the contributions for each observed fund merger or 
liquidation and each censored observation.   
[ ] ∏∏∏
= ==
>==
J
j
C
l
jl
dJ
j
j
jj
tTPtTPL
0 11
)()((  
jd  = the number of fund mergers and liquidations that occur at  ( ), such 
that  
jt Jj1 ≤≤
mdJ
1j j
=∑ =
jc  = the number of censored events between  and  jt 1jt +
 
The likelihood function is maximized when the discrete hazard function is equal to 
the fraction of those funds terminated relative to those funds at risk of merger or 
liquidation at . The derivation of the Kaplan Meier maximum likelihood estimate of 
the survival function is in Appendix B. The resulting survival function estimate is 
represented by:   
jt
∏ ≤ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −=
tjt
j
j
n
d
1)t(Sˆ       (2) 
The survival distribution for Australian funds is depicted in Figure 4.2. The x-axis 
denotes the fund age in months, and the y-axis denotes the probability of a fund 
surviving past a certain age. The survival curve always starts at 1 as the probability of 
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 a fund surviving past the age of 0 month is equal to 1. The survival probability 
decreases as the age of the fund increases. 
 
According to the Australian data, the probability of an Australian fund surviving 
beyond the age of 1 year is 0.99, the probability of an Australian fund surviving 
beyond the age of 5 years is 0.82, and the probability of an Australian fund surviving 
beyond the age of 10 years is 0.65. The probability that a fund will survive past age 
20 is only 0.41. In other words, there is more than 50 percent chance that a fund will 
terminate before reaching 20 years of age. 
 
The French data shows a very similar survival function with slightly higher survival 
probabilities at the higher age end. The probability of a French fund surviving beyond 
the age of 1 year is 0.99, surviving beyond the age of 5 years is 0.86 and surviving 
beyond the age of 10 years is 0.65. The probability that it will survive past age 20 is 
only little above 30 percent. The UK data depicts slightly higher survival probabilities 
compared to Australia and France, with an 100 percent , 89 percent and 71 percent 
chance that a fund will survive past the ages of 1, 5 and 10 years, respectively. The 
probability that it will survive past age 20 is approximately 50 percent. 
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Figure 4.2 Kaplan-Meier Survival Functions 
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 4.5 Survival Function Comparison between Fund Categories 
Figure 4.2 shows a comparison of the survival functions of categories of Australian, 
French and UK funds. It is particularly worth noting the shape of the curves – the 
survival probabilities vary across classes of assets, particularly in the speed at which 
the probability of merger or liquidation increases. In Australia (Panel A), the 
allocation category has higher survival probabilities than equity and fixed income 
categories from an age of approximately 10 years onwards. Fixed income funds also 
have higher survival probabilities than equity funds from 15 years of age onwards. 
The sudden drop in survival rates for allocation funds after the age of 400 months is 
caused by the liquidation of ANZ - AFT Savings Trust which terminated at the age of 
432 months. 
 
In France (Panel B), allocation funds also seem to have the highest survival 
probability, followed by money market funds. Alternative funds, such as hedge funds, 
have the lowest survival probabilities out of all categories. This is consistent with 
their high risk-taking characteristics. Again, allocation funds scored the highest 
survival probability in the UK (Panel C), with equity funds being the next highest in 
rank, followed by fixed income and money market funds. Alternative funds are again 
ranked as having the lowest survival probabilities out of all the categories.  
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 Figure 4.3 Comparisons of Kaplan-Meier Survival Functions by Categories 
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While observing the survival curves helps to gain a feel for the comparative survival 
rates, a log rank test and a Wilcoxon test are also conducted to the test for statistically 
significant differences in these curves.  
 
The Log rank and Wilcoxon tests are nonparametric tests derived using a quadratic 
form or weighted sum of squares. The base for these tests are the vector u 
∑
=
−−=
k
j
rjrjjjj ededtwu
1
11 ),...,)(('  
and the variance matrix V with entries 
⎟⎟⎠
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where i = 1, …, r and l = 1, …, r and Iil is an indicator function that takes on value 1 if 
i = 1 and zero otherwise. 
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The two tests have the same null hypothesis, that there is no difference in the survival 
rates,(i.e. ), versus the alternate hypothesis, that not all survival 
functions are the same.   
rSSSH === ...: 210
 
Hypothesis 4.1: There are no differences in the survival functions between fund 
categories for Australian, France and UK 
 
To test the null hypothesis that all survival functions are the same, a test statistic is 
formed as the quadratic form, , with a chi-squared distribution with r – 1 
degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis. This quadratic form essentially creates 
a weighted sum of squared differences between the observed number of events in 
each group and the expected number under the null hypothesis that there are no 
differences. The weights are defined by the covariance matrix V. 
uVu 1' −
 
The Wilcoxon test statistic is given by the quadratic form given above with 
, the number at risk of the event, just before the event occurs. So that each 
difference between observed and expected number of events is weighted by the 
number at risk.  
jj ntw =)(
 
A variation of this test uses the test statistic with 1)( =jtw  so that the differences 
between observed and expected survival have the same weight, 1, for all event times. 
A compromise between the Wilcoxon and Log Rank tests uses jj ntw =)( . If the 
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 log rank test and the Wilcoxon test give conflicting results, the compromise test will 
be used. 
 
The Wilcoxon test is more sensitive to differences in survival curves early in time 
because differences between observed and expected counts are weighted more heavily 
by the number at risk , and for early events this weight is typically large. This gives 
sensitivity to early differences. By contract, the log rank test tends to be more 
sensitive to differences later in time.  
jn
 
As shown in Table 4.2, the null hypothesis that there are no differences in the survival 
functions between fund categories is not rejected for Australia, but it is rejected for 
France and the UK. This indicates that the differences between survival functions of 
different asset classes are not statistically important for Australia, but are statistically 
important for France and the UK. The insignificant result for Australia could be 
caused by the sudden drop of the survival curve at 432 months resulting from the 
liquidation of a long-life allocation fund ANZ - AFT Savings Trust.  
 
These statistical test results are consistent with the observations from the graphs. The 
survival curves of the three asset classes in Australia are very close for the first 100 
months of age and equity and fixed income drop below the allocation class at around 
the age of 100 months. The separation of the curves occur earlier for France and UK. 
The timing (in terms of age of the fund) of the drop for alternative class occurs very 
early in fund life, and this changes the functions dramatically across the asset classes. 
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 Table 4.2 Log-rank and Wilcoxon Test Results 
  Australia France United 
Kingdom 
No. of Fund Categories 3 5 5 
Chisq 4.40 878.00 130.00 Logrank test 
p-value 0.11 0.00** 0.00** 
Chisq 2.20 786.00 136.00 Wilcoxon test 
p-value 0.34 0.00** 0.00** 
Logrank test statistic with χ2(n-1) distribution. The figures in parentheses are p-values. 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
This chapter investigates the survival probabilities of managed funds in Australia, 
France and the UK. Three aspects of fund mergers and liquidations are investigated – 
the time to fund merger or liquidation, the probability of a fund surviving to a certain 
age, and the difference in survival probabilities between different fund categories. 
Examination of fund mergers and liquidations over time and the age distribution of 
terminated funds show that funds that merge or liquidate generally merge or liquidate 
at a young age. In fact, more than half of the total Australian funds that terminated 
had terminated between the age of 1-year and 5-years. 
 
The non-parametric Kaplan-Meier estimator for survival functions is used to estimate 
probabilities of survival from historical data. It is found that survival probabilities 
deteriorate faster as the age of the fund increases. In particular, the probability of a 
fund surviving beyond the age of 10 years is approximately 65 percent in Australia 
and France, and 71 percent in the UK.  
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The log rank and Wilcoxon tests are used to test whether the survival functions for the 
different categories of funds are statistically different. It is found that there are 
differences in survival probabilities between different fund categories, in particular 
allocation (balanced) funds have a higher probability of survival than alternative 
funds, which include funds such as hedge funds. These differences are significant in 
France and UK, but not in Australia where there are fewer categories available for 
analysis. Overall, the results highlight the importance of an awareness of survival 
probabilities when investing in managed funds.   
 
It is noted that the Kaplan Meier estimator and Wilcoxon tests have their detractors, 
but these methods are used in this analysis as they are well-accepted and commonly 
used methods in survival analysis. However, alternative specifications of the Kaplan-
Meier and Wilcoxon approaches, such as the adaptively weighted Kaplan-Meier 
estimate (see Plante 2009), may be used to perform similar analysis in future 
extensions to the work covered in this thesis.   
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Chapter 5 Predicting Fund Survival Probabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
An observation from the births and terminations data of managed funds is that some 
funds survive significantly longer than others, whereas other funds survive for a very 
short time. One of the aims this thesis is to study the causes of this discrepancy in the 
survival probabilities between funds. As such, this chapter analyses which factors 
influence a fund’s survival and the magnitude of their influence. 
 
As described in Chapter 3, the range of factors that affect a fund’s probability of 
survival is broad. To name a few, age, raw return, return relative to peers, return 
relative to benchmark, size, fee structure, size of the fund’s management company, 
fund manager experience and the technology that the fund uses are all factors that 
impact on a fund’s probability of survival. 
 
There are statistical modelling constraints limiting the number of factors in the 
analysis. Thus, the study focuses on a key number of factors, including fund return 
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 relative to benchmark, return relative to peers, skewness of the returns, fund size and 
size of the fund’s management company. The aim is to provide an insight into 
whether these variables explain fund mergers and liquidations.  
 
While studies on factors that impact fund survival have been conducted by Brown and 
Goetzmann (1995), Lunde, Timmermann and Blake (1999) and Cameron and Hall 
(2003), this chapter extends survival analysis to include more valuables including 
total rank within category, skewness, individual fund size and family size. In addition, 
this study focuses on comparison of three countries, namely, Australia, France and the 
UK, to investigate and compare the effect these variables have on the fund survival 
probabilities of these three countries. 
 
5.2 Factors Affecting Fund Survival 
Performance relative to benchmark 
One factor that is likely to affect fund termination is the performance of the fund. 
When a fund does not generate satisfactory returns for its investors, the theory of 
“smart money” effects suggests that investors will withdraw their investment and put 
it into alternative investments. In particular, the smart money literature, including 
Ippolito (1992), Goetzmann and Peles (1993), Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999), have 
reported that money flows into funds with high recent returns and flows out of poor 
past performers. If the smart money effect is present, poor performance would lead to 
withdrawals, which can trigger distressed merger or liquidation.  
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 There is mixed evidence for the “smart money” effect. Sirri and Tufano (1998) found 
that although investors competitively put money into good past performers, they fail 
to withdraw from poor past performers. This chapter investigates whether the smart 
money effect leads to termination of managed funds. 
 
Portfolio performance may be measured in absolute terms or relative terms. Raw 
returns and the Sharpe ratio are the most direct pieces of information for investors. 
The best-known relative return measures are the Jensen’s alpha and the Treynor 
index.  After analysing the correlation coefficients between these variables, Jensen’s 
alpha and the ranking of fund are chosen as measures of fund performance in the 
analysis that follows. However, robustness tests show that the choice of measure has 
little impact on the final results.  
 
Performance measure 1: Jensen’s alpha 
Jensen’s alpha (alpha) is commonly used in academic research, as it provides a 
measure of whether a manager outperforms the market, as well as suggesting the 
magnitude of over/under performance under the assumption that the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) holds. Alpha is a measure of excess return, which compares 
the return on the portfolio to that expected under the CAPM. 
 
It is hypothesised that a fund with a high positive alpha would survive longer than a 
fund that has a lower alpha due to its ability to generate abnormal returns. This 
hypothesis is consistent with the smart money literature, which suggests that 
underperforming funds are particularly susceptible to the pressure of unit redemptions 
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 and so those funds exhibiting negative alpha would be less likely to survive. This 
gives rise to the following hypothesis. 
 Hypothesis 5.1: Fund survival probability is positively related with Jensen’s 
alpha. 
 
Performance measure 2: Ranking of fund in category 
Total return rank in category is a measure used by Morningstar to rank a fund’s 
performance within its Morningstar category. It denotes the rank in terms of 
percentile -  the highest (or most favourable) percentile rank is 1 and the lowest (or 
least favourable) percentile rank is 100.  Due to the nature of the measure, it is not 
correlated with Alpha, and therefore provides a further measure of fund performance 
that may be useful in explaining fund survival. One would expect a fund with higher 
rank (closer to 1) to survive longer, with funds in a lower relative position being more 
prone to termination due to investor exit. Thus, it is expected that a fund with a lower 
rank will face a lower risk of termination. This gives rise to hypothesis 5.2. 
Hypothesis 5.2: Fund survival probability is negatively related with 
Morningstar’s ranking of a fund within its category 
 
There are a number of other variables that could predict fund termination, including 
skewness of fund return distribution, size of the fund, and fund family size. 
Skewness 
Skewness reflects the degree of asymmetry of a distribution. A longer left tail 
indicates negative skewness and a longer right tail indicates positive skewness. 
Reimann (2006) found that asset returns mostly exhibit slight skewness rather than 
following a symmetric normal distribution with a skewness of zero. Research on the 
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 “hot hands” phenomenon found evidence for persistence in managed fund returns, 
providing support for skewness in managed fund returns. 8 
 
If a return distribution exhibits positive skewness, the managed fund tends to have 
frequent small losses (or gains, depending on the mean of the distribution) and a few 
extreme gains. Similarly, a return distribution with negative skewness has frequent 
small gains (or losses, depending on the mean of the distribution)) and a few extreme 
losses. Extreme values in returns are likely to affect fund flows, as suggested by 
research on the “smart money” effect (e.g. Sirri and Tufano (1998) found that 
investors chase funds with the highest past returns). As such, a fund with higher 
skewness (more extreme positive returns than negative) may attract fund flows and 
survive longer. This gives rise to the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5.3: Fund survival probability is positively related with skewness. 
 
Fund Size 
The effect of fund size on the performance of a fund is subject to a considerable 
amount of debate in the academic community. Some evidence suggests that larger 
funds outperform smaller funds (Gallagher and Martin 2005). On the other hand, there 
is evidence suggesting that a fund’s flexibility in the market reduces as the fund gets 
larger and this could restrict its performance. As such, funds can benefit from 
downsizing to reduce their price impact as well as benefiting from lower transaction 
costs and administration costs (US literature include Beckers and Vaughan 2001 Chen 
et al 2004, Droms and Walker 1995 and Ciccotello and Grant 2001, Australian 
                                                 
8 See chapter 2 for literature on the ‘hot hands’ phenomenon. 
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 literature include Holmes and Faff 2000 and Bilson, Frino and Heaney 2004 and 
Heaney 2008).  
 
Some researchers search for a compromise between the two extremes and propose an 
optimal fund size. For example, Perold and Salomon (1991) propose an optimal fund 
size model based on the marginal cost of additional growth, while Indro et al (1999) 
propose a non-linear model to capture the relation between fund size and performance 
and find an optimal fund size for the sample equal to approximately USD 1.0 billion. 
However, the existence of optimal fund size is queried by Berk and Green (2004) 
based on the argument that the level of management fees increases with the size of the 
fund and the ability of managers to create superior returns decreases with the size of 
the fund.  As such, Berk and Green (2004) suggest that each fund’s equilibrium fund 
size is determined by the skill of the manager and its cost function.   
 
This chapter studies the impact of fund size on the survival probability of a managed 
fund. A fund’s larger asset base could make it more resilient to redemption, but its 
performance may be restricted by transaction costs and price impact. In Morningstar, 
fund size is measured by the total net asset value under management. In the sample, 
the average size of an Australian fund and a French fund are both $1 billion, whereas 
the average size of a UK fund is 50% higher at $1.5 billion.  
Hypothesis 5.4: Fund survival probability is positively related to fund size. 
 
Fund Family Size 
Fund family size is measured by the number of funds in a fund family. The largest 
Australian fund family, Skandia, has 421 funds, while the smallest Australian fund 
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 family has only one fund. The size of a fund family has two offsetting effects on the 
survival probabilities of a fund. First, a larger fund family may be more likely to 
undertake strategic mergers to achieve economies of scale and eliminate duplicate or 
legacy products. In addition, a larger fund family may have more scope for merging 
or liquidating distressed funds in an economic downturn to maximise performance at 
the fund family level. Indeed, Massa (2003) reports that fund families maximise 
performance at both the individual fund level as well as at the level of the fund 
family. This gives families the incentives for ‘cross-fund subsidisation’, which 
involves enhancing the performance of some funds in the family even if it is at the 
expense of some other funds (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos 2005). Thus, funds in a 
larger fund family may be more likely to merge. Nonetheless, smaller fund families 
may have less capacity to sustain underperforming funds relative to larger fund 
family, thus generating an offsetting effect. Overall, the effect of a larger fund family 
could be stronger and this gives rise to the final hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 6.5: Fund survival probability is positively related to fund family 
size. 
 
5.3 The Cox Regression Model 
To analyse the influence of several explanatory variables on the survival prospects of 
funds, we use the semi-parametric regression model, Cox regression. The underlying 
idea of the Cox regression approach is the comparative risk of an individual 
experiencing the event, given an event occurs at that time. Let [ ]p21 x...xxx =  
represent a vector of p predictors, the hazard function at time t is represented by:   
)x...x(exp)t(h)x|t(h pp110 ββ ++=     (3) 
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 The function  is called the baseline hazard function and is the hazard function of 
a fund with covariates , where 
)t(h 0
0x =ρ p2,..., 1,=ρ .  The hazard function at time t is a 
multiple of the baseline hazard function and an exponential function of predictors. 
The log likelihood function is represented by:   
∏∑= ∈=
J
1j )t(Ri i0
j0
j
)x'(exp)t(h
)x'(exp)t(h
)(L β
ββ     (4) 
The score function, U(β) is the vector of first derivatives of the log likelihood with 
respect to the parameters:   
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ββ     (5) 
Setting the score function to zero and solving for β gives the maximum likelihood 
estimates of β. The β’s are the regression coefficients of the explanatory variables and 
are the subject of analysis. Cox regression provides a semi-parametric method of 
estimating β’s because it avoids specification of the baseline hazard function. 
 
The Cox regression model used for estimating the effect of the variables on survival 
probability of managed funds is as follows: 
)x...x(exp)t(h)x|t(h pp110 ββ ++=      
where x1 to x11 refer to the following regression covariates. Substituting in the 
variables, the regression model becomes: 
)SizeAlpha(exp)t(h)x|t(h 543210 FamilySkewnessRanking βββββ ++++=  (3) 
where 
Alpha = Prior year skewness before fund termination or end of study, 
whichever is earlier 
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 Ranking = Rank within fund category 12 months before fund termination or 
end of study, whichever is earlier 
Skewness = Prior year alpha before fund termination or end of study, 
whichever is earlier 
Size   = Average net assets over life of fund 
Family  = Family size as at end of study, of the fund family that the fund 
belongs to 
 
    
5.4 Data 
Not all of the funds in the dataset for chapter 3 have data on all of the regression 
variables used in this study. Therefore, only funds with data on all of the variables are 
included in the analysis described in this chapter. 
 
After filtering out funds with incomplete data, the dataset for Cox regression analysis 
consists of 2069 Australian funds which include 1239 equity funds, 324 fixed income 
funds and 506 allocation funds, 1727 France Funds which include 646 equity funds, 
413 fixed income funds, 254 money market funds and 277 allocation funds, and 1006 
UK funds which include 727 equity funds, 184 fixed income funds, 18 money market 
funds and 77 allocation funds. 
 
Data collected for each fund include category, inception date, obsolete date, obsolete 
type (merged or liquidated), firm name, monthly return for period, alpha, total return 
percentage rank, skewness and net asset value. Table 5.1 reports descriptive statistics 
for the variables used in later analysis. 
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 Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
Panel A: Australia 
 Alpha Skewness 
Relative 
Ranking 
Size ($m Local 
Currency) 
Family Size 
Average 9.74 -0.37 50 1003 188 
Standard Dev 9.72 0.44 30 2509 146 
Maximum 59.43 2.35 100 47696 421 
Minimum -29.64 -2.61 1 0.038 1 
 
Panel B: France 
 Alpha Skewness 
Relative 
Ranking 
Size ($m Local 
Currency) 
Family Size 
Average 6.73 -0.33 51 1094 129 
Standard Dev 7.68 0.57 28 6102 143 
Maximum 44.33 2.89 100 230023 550 
Minimum -30.06 -2.88 1 0.00146 1 
 
Panel C: United Kingdom 
 Alpha Skewness 
Relative 
Ranking 
Size ($m Local 
Currency) 
Family Size 
Average 9.02 -0.27 50 1486 81 
Standard Dev 8.52 0.57 28 6328 58 
Maximum 49.73 2.70 99 150014 390 
Minimum -22.12 -2.31 0 0.00234 1 
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 Table 5.2 Correlation between Explanatory Variables 
Panel A: Australia 
 Skewness Alpha 
Size (in 
Millions) 
Relative 
ranking 
Alpha 0.00    
Size (in Million) 0.14 0.07   
Relative ranking 0.03 -0.04 0.08  
Family Size -0.01 -0.08 -0.02 0.06 
 
Panel B: France 
 Skewness Alpha 
Size (in 
Millions) 
Relative 
ranking 
Alpha 0.21    
Size (in Million) 0.02 0.01   
Relative ranking 0.10 0.01 -0.03  
Family Size 0.08 0.07 0.10 -0.12 
 
Panel C: United Kingdom 
 Skewness Alpha 
Size (in 
Millions) 
Relative 
ranking 
Alpha -0.04    
Size (in Million) -0.07 0.02   
Relative ranking -0.03 -0.36 0.03  
Family Size -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 
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Table 5.2 shows the correlation between the explanatory variables. The correlation 
coefficients between the explanatory variables are low for all countries. With the 
absolute value of correlation coefficients lower than 0.4 in all cases, it is not expected 
that multi-colinearity will be a problem in the analysis that follows. 
 
5.5 Results 
Results from the Cox regression analysis are reported in Table 5.3. The regression 
coefficient (β), the P-value (P) and the relative risk coefficient (exp(β)) are reported 
for each of the independent variables. All of our explanatory variables are continuous, 
so the regression coefficient gives the change in log hazard for an increase of 1 in the 
value of the explanatory variable. A positive regression coefficient implies that the 
hazard rate is higher for higher values of the coefficient, while a negative regression 
coefficient implies that the hazard rate is lower for higher values of that coefficient. 
Relative risk refers to the proportional change in the hazard rate for an increase of 1 in 
the value of the explanatory variable. Thus, the exponential coefficients are 
interpretable as multiplicative effects on the hazard. For example, holding the other 
covariates constant, an additional $1 million in Australian fund size reduces the 
hazard by a factor of e-0.0028 = 0.997 on average – that is, by 0.3 percent.  
 
5.5.1 Australian Funds 
The likelihood-ratio, Wald, and score chi-square statistics are asymptotically 
equivalent tests of the null hypothesis that all of the β’s are zero. The null hypothesis 
is soundly rejected when all three test statistics are in close agreement. For the 
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 Australia sample, the three tests give test statistics that are significant at 5%. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis that all of the β’s are zero is rejected. 
 
For Australian funds, the β’s for Alpha and Size are both significant at the 5% level, 
indicating that they are key drivers for fund hazard rate. The β for Alpha is negative, 
indicating that a higher alpha leads to lower hazard rate and thus higher survival 
probability. This observation is supports hypothesis 5.1 and is partly consistent with 
the empirical result of Cameron and Hall (2003) on Australian equity funds.9 The 
hazard rate decreases by 4.8% for every increase of 1% in the 12 months lagged 
alpha. Larger fund size also leads to higher survival probability (β = -0.0028), with a 
0.3% decrease in the hazard rate for every $1 million increase in size. This result 
supports Jayaraman, Khorana and Nelling (2002) which found that target funds are 
considerably smaller than acquiring funds. In addition, this result is consistent with 
result from corporate mergers and liquidations (Peel and Wilson 1989), which found 
that merged or liquidated firms are significantly smaller (at the 1% level) than the 
surviving firms.  
 
While statistically insignificant, skewness is positively related to the survival rate (β=-
0.5054), with an increase in 1 in skewness reducing the hazard rate by 39%. Relative 
ranking is statistically insignificant though negatively related to the survival rate, 
indicating that a fund has a higher survival rate as its relative ranking approaches one. 
Family size is statistically insignificant and positively related to survival rate. The 
addition of one fund to the family increases the hazard rate by 0.2%. The positive 
                                                 
9 Cameron and Hall (2003) found negative relationship between performance (represented by excess 
return, cumulative access return and absolute return) and survival rate, but the statistics are largely 
insignificant.  
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 insignificant relationship between family size and survival rate provides support for 
hypothesis 5.5 that families with more diversified products are more likely to shut 
down poor-performing funds to maximise family performance, inturn providing 
support for ‘cross-fund subsidisation’ (Massa 2003, Gaspar, Massa, and Matos 2005). 
 
5.5.2 French Funds 
For France, the likelihood ratio, Wald and score tests all give significant results at the 
5% level, rejecting the null hypothesis that all of the β’s are zero. Again, alpha and 
fund size are statistically significant drivers of fund termination (with P-value < 5%). 
Alpha has a negative β, indicating a fund with a higher alpha is less likely to 
terminate. This observation is consistent with hypothesis 5.1 that the more the fund 
outperforms the market the less likely it is to be closed down. 
 
The β for size is also negative, indicating a larger fund is less likely to terminate. 
Family size is another significant driver of fund termination for the French funds, 
having a β significant at 10%. The exponential coefficient indicates that an increase of 
one fund to the family increases the hazard rate by 0.1%. The β for family size is 
positive indicating funds in smaller families are less likely to be closed down. This 
result supports the evidence from the Australian sample that fund family strategies 
negatively affect the survival rates of the funds in the sample, and provides support 
for Massa (2003) and Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005). 
 
Statistically insignificant drivers include skewness and relative ranking. In France an 
increase of 1 in skewness leads to a smaller reduction in hazard rate than is evident in 
Australia (eβ=2.8% in France, eβ =30% in Australia). The exponential coefficient for 
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 relative ranking indicates an improvement of 1 in the ranking reduces hazard rate by 
0.1%. 
 
5.5.3 UK Funds 
The Cox regression likelihood ratio, Wald and score tests for the UK are also all 
significant at 5%. The UK has different drivers for fund termination – the β’s for fund 
size and fund family size are significant at 5%. The β’s for both fund size and family 
size are negative, indicating that both larger funds and funds from larger fund families 
are less likely to terminate. The sign for fund family size is different from Australia 
and France which exhibit insignificant positive relationships with the hazard rate at 
the 5% level. 
 
The β’s for skewness and relative ranking are significant at 10%.  The negative β for 
skewness indicates that funds with higher skewness are less likely to terminate - 
consistent with hypothesis 5.3. Also, hypothesis 5.2 is not rejected with a positive β 
for relative return, indicating a higher ranked fund (rank closer to 1) is less likely to 
terminate, supporting the result of Lunde, Timmermann and Blake (1999), which 
found statistically significant positive relationship between return and survival 
probability for UK equity funds.  
 
Surprisingly, the β for alpha is not significant for UK funds, although the sign is 
consistent with Australia and France, while relative ranking is significant at 10%. The 
UK market appears to be more sensitive to relative return within category than to the 
performance measure, alpha. 
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 Table 5.3 Cox Regression Results 
Panel A: Australia 
 coef exp(coef) se(coef) z p 
Alpha -0.0493 0.9520 0.0160 -3.0800 0.0021** 
Skewness -0.5054 0.6030 0.3969 -1.2700 0.2000 
Relative ranking 0.0063 1.0060 0.0058 1.0700 0.2800 
Size -0.0028 0.9970 0.0009 -3.1500 0.0016** 
Family Size 0.0020 1.0020 0.0013 1.5600 0.1200 
Likelihood Ratio Test 52  on 5 degrees of freedom,   p-value=5.42e-10 
 
Panel B: France 
 coef exp(coef) se(coef) z p 
Alpha -0.0281 0.9720 0.0088 -3.2050 0.0014** 
Skewness -0.0285 0.9720 0.1344 -0.2120 0.8300 
Relative ranking 0.0011 1.0010 0.0029 0.3890 0.7000 
Size -0.0005 1.0000 0.0001 -3.9170 0.0001** 
Family Size 0.0010 1.0010 0.0005 1.8990 0.0580* 
Likelihood Ratio Test 41.2  on 5 degrees of freedom,   p-value=8.45e-08 
 
Panel C: United Kingdom 
 coef exp(coef) se(coef) z p 
Alpha -0.0014 0.9990 0.0182 -0.0767 0.9400 
Skewness -0.4945 0.6100 0.2612 -1.8933 0.0580* 
Relative ranking 0.0100 1.0100 0.0054 1.8307 0.0670* 
Size -0.0005 1.0000 0.0002 -2.4428 0.0150** 
Family Size -0.0074 0.9930 0.0029 -2.5778 0.0099** 
Likelihood Ratio Test 25.9  on 5 degrees of freedom,   p-value=9.27e-05 
Note: ** Significant at 5% level, * Significant at 10% level 
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Overall, the null hypothesis that all of the β’s are zero is rejected for all three 
countries. An important observation from the Cox Regression results is the 
significance of fund size in explaining the failure rates of managed funds.  For all 
three countries, size is significant at 5% and the sign is negative, indicating larger 
funds are less likely to terminate. Other variables vary in significance across the three 
countries but β signs are generally consistent. Further, the results for the French funds 
are closer to those reported for Australian funds though there are some important 
differences between the funds available in these two countries relative to the funds 
available in the UK particularly with Cox regression models. Since France and 
Australia have larger managed fund markets than the UK, the results may indicate 
problems associated with the smaller size of the UK fund market though we leave 
further analysis of this question to future research. 
 
5.6 Conclusions 
This chapter investigates factors that contribute to fund termination and predicts fund 
survival probabilities based on these factors. Cox regression is employed to deal with 
censored data. The fund’s survival probability is regressed against a number of fund 
characteristics to identify factors that affect a fund’s probability of survival. The 
results on relative performance (represented by alpha) are broadly consistent with 
Lunde, Timmermann and Blake (1999) on UK equity funds and Cameron and Hall 
(2003) on Australian equity funds. This chapter further extends the analysis to include 
valuables including total rank within category, skewness, individual fund size and 
family size. 
 95 
  
The factors that impact on survival are similar for Australia and France but somewhat 
different between Australia and the UK. For Australia and France, the regression 
coefficient for alpha is negative and significant at 5%, indicating that a higher alpha 
leads to lower hazard rate and thus higher survival probability. This observation is 
consistent with hypothesis 5.1 that fund survival probability is positively related with 
Jensen’s alpha, in turn providing support for the smart money effect. For the UK, both 
relative ranking and skewness are significant at the 10% level. Relative ranking is 
negatively related to survival probability while skewness is positively related, 
supporting both hypotheses 5.2 and 5.3. Across the three countries, fund size is 
significant in that a larger fund is less likely to terminate, supporting hypothesis 5.4 
that fund survival probability is positively related to fund size. Nonetheless, the effect 
of fund family size yields mixed results, with Australian and French results showing 
an insignificant and negative significant relationship between family size and survival 
rate, respectively, and the UK result showing a positive insignificant relationship 
between family size and survival rate, providing support for hypothesis 5.5 that fund 
survival probability is positively related to fund family size. 
 
In summary, this chapter found that across the three countries under investigation, 
larger funds are less likely to terminate. In addition, in Australia and France, funds 
with higher alphas are less likely to terminate, and in the UK funds from larger fund 
families are less likely to terminate.  
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Chapter 6 Explaining Termination Status: Mergers 
versus Liquidations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Literature on corporate mergers and liquidations presents contradicting results on 
whether mergers and liquidations have distinctly different causes and characteristics. 
Dewey (1961) suggested that most mergers are not related to the creation of market 
power or the realisation of economies of scale, but are “merely a civilised alternative 
to bankruptcy or voluntary liquidation that transfer assets from falling to rising firms”. 
Yet, Boyle (1970) examined a sample of 165 US-acquired firms over the period 1948-
63 and suggested that only 10% of the companies were loss-making when they were 
acquired.  
 
Managed funds literature is silent on the distinction between liquidated funds and 
merged funds. The terminated funds analysed in chapter 5 included both merged 
funds and liquidated funds. Yet, mergers and liquidations may have different causes 
which, in turn, may exhibit different characteristics. Explanations for mergers are 
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 broader than causes for liquidations. To illustrate, figure 3.1 in Chapter 3 describes 
two types of mergers. The first type of merger is strategic merger. It is driven by 
strategic decisions made by managed fund companies, such as exploiting economies 
of scale, reducing the number of duplicate products, removing legacy products and a 
shift in investor preference. The second type of merger is distressed merger. These 
mergers are usually forced mergers which may be initiated by the creditors or the 
court, or the fund may have triggered the provision for wind up under its own 
constitution. An important characteristic of strategic mergers distinguishing them 
from distressed mergers and liquidations is that they are usually supported by the 
majority of investors. Rather, sometimes investors may receive a better investment 
outcome from the merger. Liquidations have similar causes as distressed mergers. For 
instance, funds may achieve consistently low return and this may lead to the 
withdrawal of cash from the funds. In these cases the investment company may merge 
the worse performing fund into a better performing fund within the same company, or 
sell the fund to another company, or in the worst case liquidate the fund.  
 
This chapter investigates impacts of certain characteristics of the funds on the 
termination status of the fund, i.e. whether a fund is merged or liquidated. This study 
is important for two reasons. Firstly, if mergers and liquidations exhibit distinctly 
different characteristics, further studies that involve non-surviving funds may need to 
separate out the two datasets. Secondly, while the model presented in Chapter 3 is 
useful for conceptualizing the different causes of mergers and liquidations, it is 
extremely difficult to empirically test the model using historical data. It is because 
merged funds data do not include the reasons for mergers and the limited availability 
of merged funds data precludes using data mining techniques to separate the funds 
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 into groups. This study examines a more empirically testable problem, that is, whether 
mergers and liquidations may be distinguished by certain fund characteristics. 
Answers to this problem have important implications for regulators because, as 
discussed in chapter 3, effective regulation of managed fund mergers and liquidations 
should avoid a “one size fits all” approach. This chapter finds characteristics that help 
draw the line between mergers and liquidations and provides indications for the areas 
that regulators could look at when designing policy. 
 
Note that Australian data does not distinguish between mergers and liquidation as the 
Australian legislation does not facilitate mergers. Consequently, only UK and French 
data is used in this Chapter. The Chapter begins by analysing the difference in 
historical performance between liquidated funds, merged funds and surviving funds, 
and then goes on to study the effects of certain factors on the termination status of the 
funds. 
 
6.2 Raw returns, Sharpe Ratio and Alpha 
Cameron and Hall (2003) found that the impact of relative returns is much larger than 
gross returns, with higher relative returns associated with lower probability of fund 
termination. This section compares the historical performance of surviving, liquidated 
and merged funds using three performance measures, namely monthly raw returns, 
annual Sharpe ratios and annual alphas. These performance measures report on 
different aspects of a fund’s performance. Raw returns are obtained from the 
Morningstar total returns data series10. Although the raw return on its own is not a fair 
                                                 
10 Morningstar’s calculation of total return is determined by taking the change in price, reinvesting, if 
applicable, all income and capital-gains distributions during that month, and dividing by the starting 
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 reflection of the fund’s performance, it is a popular piece of information that the 
public use to assess fund performance. The Sharpe Ratio is a popular measure of risk 
adjusted return and is calculated as the excess return of the fund over the risk-free rate 
divided by the standard deviation of the excess return. Alpha is a measure of how a 
fund performs relative to its expected return expected under CAPM. 
 
Data consists of monthly raw returns, annual Sharpe Ratios and annual alphas from 1 
May 1987 to 30 Jun 2008. UK monthly raw return data consists of 227,075 monthly 
returns from 3,489 surviving funds, 13,672 monthly returns from 807 liquidated funds 
and 8,974 monthly returns from 524 merged funds. UK annual Sharpe ratio and alpha 
data consists of 18,325 annual Sharpe ratios and the same number of alphas from 
3,489 surviving funds, 934 annual Sharpe ratios and the same number of alphas from 
807 liquidated funds and 672 annual Sharpe ratios and the same number of alphas 
from 524 merged funds. 
 
French monthly raw return data consists of 269,711 monthly returns from 4,003 
surviving funds, 39,077 monthly returns from 1,630 liquidated funds and 14,446 
monthly returns from 781 merged funds. UK annual Sharpe ratio and alpha data 
consists of 19,580 annual Sharpe ratios and the same number of alphas from 4,003 
surviving funds, 5,903 annual Sharpe ratios and the same number of alphas from 
1,630 liquidated funds and 3,198 annual Sharpe ratios and the same number of alphas 
from 781 merged funds. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
price. Reinvestments are made using the actual reinvestment price, and daily payoffs are reinvested 
monthly. 
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Table 6.1 Comparison of Monthly Returns, Annual Sharpe ratios and Annual 
Alphas between Surviving Funds, Liquidated Funds and Merged Funds 
 
Panel A: UK 
 
Average monthly 
return (%) 
Average annual 
Sharpe ratio 
Average annual 
Alpha 
Surviving Funds 0.52 0.53 2.67 
Liquidated funds 0.43 0.48 1.94 
Merged funds 0.54 0.54 1.02 
P(t-stat) - Surviving vs. Liquidated 0.01** 0.27 0.08* 
P(t-stat) - Surviving vs. Merged  0.77 0.83 0.00** 
P(t-stat) - Merged vs. Liquidated 0.09* 0.36 0.18 
 
Panel B: France 
 
Average monthly 
return (%) 
Average annual 
Sharpe ratio 
Average annual 
Alpha 
Surviving Funds 0.35 0.46 2.60 
Liquidated funds 0.36 0.45 2.45 
Merged funds 0.41 0.38 1.69 
P(t-stat) - Surviving vs. Liquidated 0.51 0.91 0.37 
P(t-stat) - Surviving vs. Merged 0.03** 0.00** 0.00** 
P(t-stat) - Merged vs. Liquidated 0.11 0.00** 0.00** 
 
Notes:  
** Significant at 5%, * Significant at 10% 
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Table 6.1 shows the average monthly return, Sharpe ratio and alpha over the sample 
period, with p-values on the t-test of two samples with different sample sizes and 
different variances. Panel A shows the results for the UK. Liquidated funds have 
significantly lower monthly returns than surviving funds, while the difference 
between merged funds and surviving funds is not statistically significant. The 
differences in annual Sharpe ratios between the three types of funds are not 
statistically significant. In the right-most column, it is shown that merged funds have 
significantly lower annual alpha than surviving funds at the 5% level, and so do 
liquidated funds at the 10% level. The difference in alpha between merged funds and 
liquidated funds is not statistically significant. 
 
For France, the difference between monthly raw returns for surviving and liquidated 
funds is not significantly different. Merged funds exhibit significantly higher monthly 
raw returns than surviving funds, though they have significantly lower annual Sharpe 
ratios than surviving and liquidated funds. The difference between annual Sharpe 
ratios and annual alphas for surviving and liquidated funds are not significantly 
different, and merged funds have significantly lower annual alpha than surviving and 
liquidated funds.  
 
In summary, there are differences across the two countries as well as consistency. For 
example, for both countries merged funds have significantly lower alphas than 
surviving funds at the 5% level, while the difference in alphas between surviving and 
liquidated funds are not as significant. This indicates that funds that underperform 
benchmark are more likely to be merged than liquidated. Interestingly, in UK the 
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 funds that have lower raw returns are more likely to be liquidated than merged in 
these countries. On the other hand, French merged funds have significantly higher raw 
returns but significantly lower risk-adjusted returns than surviving funds, indicating 
high risk-taking in merged funds. In addition, French liquidated funds do not have 
significantly different raw returns, Sharpe ratios and alphas compared to surviving 
funds. 
 
 
6.3 Data and Methodology 
This section describes the data and methodology used for studying the effect of 
several factors on the termination status of the funds. Data on UK and French 
managed funds is collected from Morningstar. The period of study extends from 1 
July 1974 to 30 June 2008. A terminated fund is reported as either merged or 
liquidated. The mergers and liquidations data are significantly reduced when data 
points with missing data for any of the explanatory variables are excluded from the 
study. The UK data consists of 16 mergers and 34 liquidations and the French data 
consists of 116 liquidations and 55 mergers.  
 
The termination status of the fund regressed against a range of explanatory variables 
that may explain the difference between mergers and liquidations. These include the 
performance of the fund, as measured by its actual return relative to expected return 
(Jensen’s alpha) and its performance ranked within its Morningstar category, 
skewness of the return distribution, fund size, fund family size and age of the fund. 
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 Performance 
There are two measures of performance. The first is the well known Jensen’s alpha. 
The second is Morningstar’s ranking of a fund within its category, which is ranked 
according the fund’s total-return percentile relative to all funds that have the same 
Morningstar Category, with 1 being the highest rank and 100 being the lowest rank. 
While a more negative performance is associated with a higher risk of termination 
(Lunde, Timmermann and Blake 1999, Cameron and Hall 2003, with support from 
the results in chapter 5 of this thesis), it is inconclusive whether merged funds 
outperform liquidated funds. Though, evidence from research on fund mergers 
suggests that target funds significantly underperform their peers (Jayaraman, Khorana 
and Nelling 2002, Khorana, Tufano and Wedge 2007). Literature is unclear on the 
impact of performance on the termination status of managed funds. This chapter 
provides insight into the relationship between performance and termination status. 
Hypothesis 6.1: Merged funds and liquidated funds do not have significantly 
different alphas and ranking within category.  
 
Skewness 
Arditti (1971) found that skewness is positively related to asset flows while others 
found contradicting evidence (Francis 1975, Joy and Porter 1974). Yet, skewness 
could be a distinguishing factor as significant underperformance may trigger the 
fund’s constitution to wind up. Whether skewness has an effect on a fund’s decision 
to merge or liquidate is dependent on the role and effectiveness of the fund board. 
Khorana, Tufano and Wedge (2007) found that the decision to merge depends on the 
independence of the board, and a more independent board tolerates less 
underperformance before agreeing to be merged. It is not clear from the literature the 
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 impact of skewness on a managed fund’s termination status. This chapter provides 
insight into this question. 
Hypothesis 6.2: Merged funds have higher skewness than liquidated funds 
 
Size 
Studies on corporate mergers and liquidations are inconclusive on the size effect of 
the merger liquidation alternative. Pastena and Ruland (1986) found that (distressed) 
merged firms were significantly larger than liquidated firms, while Peel and Wilson 
(1989) found that there is no significant difference in the mean size of the merged 
firms and liquidated firms. More recently, Buehler, Kaiser and Jaeger (2006) found 
that larger firms are less likely to liquidate than small firms, but they are more likely 
to merge. Managed funds literature has not provided answer to the relationship 
between size and termination strategy. Though Jayaraman, Khorana and Nelling 
(2002) found that the target funds are significantly smaller than acquiring funds, and it 
is shown in chapter 5 that terminated funds are significantly smaller than surviving 
funds. This chapter provides insight into the relationship between size and termination 
status. 
Hypothesis 6.3: Size exhibit no significant impact on the termination status 
 
Family Size 
Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) provide evidence that fund families may shift 
performance between their funds in order to maximise family performance. This 
means that the performance of lower fee funds might be sacrificed to enhance the 
performance of higher fee funds. Further, both Jayaraman, Khorana and Nelling 
(2002) and Khorana, Tufano and Wedge (2007) find that in-family mergers tend to be 
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 motived by the desire to eliminate poor performing funds; whereas across-family 
mergers tend to be less performance oriented, and incorporate a variety of reasons, 
including strategic ones. When a fund performs poorly in a large family, 
constitutional restraints (for example, restraints on management fees) may prevent it 
from being merged with another fund in the same family, unless a duplicate or similar 
product is offered. Therefore, larger families may have greater incentives to liquidate 
an underperforming fund compared to a smaller family.  
Hypothesis 6.4: Liquidated funds come from larger fund families compared to 
merged funds 
  
Age 
Fund age is an indicator of its survivorship, prestige and loyalty of its investors 
(Golec 1996). In particular, Golec (1996) found that fund age is significantly 
negatively related to expense ratio, management fee, and turnover. Berk and Green 
(2004) suggest that as the age of the fund grows, investors have more information 
about the fund’s performance, and the flow of funds is less sensitive to the next 
return. Yet, there is evidence supporting that younger funds outperform older funds, 
as older funds approach their equilibrium size, report lower excess returns and 
consequently attract less cash inflow (Heaney 2008). While it is not clear from 
literature the impact of age on termination status, there is suggestion from the 
managed funds industry that a fund may become outdated in its technology or 
legislative demand, and becomes a “legacy product” (The Treasury, 2007), supporting 
the hypothesis that merged funds are older than liquidated funds.  
Hypothesis 6.5: Merged funds are older than liquidated funds. 
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 Since this study excludes surviving fund data, it is not appropriate to use methods that 
deal with censored data, such as Cox regression. Logistic regression is used to model 
the binary dependent variable “Status” as a function of six continuous and/or 
categorical explanatory variables. The logistic regression model is written as: 
 
εβββββββ +++++++= AgeSizeAlpha 6543210 FamilySkewnessRankingStatus  
 
where 
Status  = the obsolete type of the fund, equals either liquidated or merged 
Alpha  = Prior year skewness before fund termination 
Ranking = Rank within fund category 12 months before fund termination 
Skewness = Prior year alpha before fund termination 
Size  = Average net assets over life of fund  
Family  = Family size of the fund family that the fund belongs to 
Age  = Age of the fund as at fund termination 
Also, 0β  is the intercept, 51...ββ  are the regression coefficients of the explanatory 
variables, and ε  represents the error term. 
 
6.4 Results 
The descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables are shown in Table 6.2. For 
each of the explanatory variables, the mean and the standard error are reported for 
both the liquidated group and the merged group. One-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) is used to test for the differences among the explanatory variables between  
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 Table 6.2 Descriptive Statistics and T-test for Explanatory Variables  
 
Panel A: United Kingdom  
 STATUS Mean Std. Error T-Stat Significance 
Liquidated 181.7657 23.43825 4.246 .045** Age 
Merged 263.8192 29.70348   
Liquidated 9.2933 1.50037 2.400 .128 Alpha 
Merged 5.0682 2.37911   
Liquidated -.5119 .07258 4.575 .038** Skewness 
Merged -.1775 .16899   
Liquidated 468.3887 361.58206 .010 .920 Size 
Merged 525.3122 278.45703   
Liquidated 61.4412 5.50210 1.672 .202 Relative Ranking 
Merged 49.6250 6.33895   
Liquidated 65.2647 8.39280 2.991 .090* Family Size 
Merged 91.8750 13.63417   
 
Panel B: France  
 Status Mean Std. Error T-Stat Significance 
Liquidated 134.4499 6.87237 2.689 .103 Age 
Merged 155.8667 12.24791   
Liquidated 5.8188 .64762 3.639 .058* Alpha 
Merged 3.7764 .74179   
Liquidated -.2895 .07640 .448 .504 Skewness 
Merged -.3721 .07833   
Liquidated 391.9312 70.93177 .035 .851 Size 
Merged 419.2279 148.60002   
Liquidated 52.3448 2.87819 1.360 .245 Relative Ranking 
Merged 58.1818 3.99757   
Liquidated 148.2931 13.89869 7.097 .008** Family Size 
Merged 91.6364 9.62175   
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 the liquidated group and the merged group. Student’s two-sample t-test is adopted to 
test whether the means of the two groups are equal.11 
 
Table 6.2 shows that for UK, liquidated funds have higher means in prior year alpha 
and prior year relative ranking than merged funds, but lower means in age, skewness, 
size and family size than merged funds. The results from the t-tests show that the 
means of age and skewness are statistically significant between the two groups at the 
5% confidence level, while the means of family size is statistically significant 
between the two groups at the 10% confidence level. The other variables, including 
the performance measures alpha and relative ranking, and the size of the fund, are not 
statistically significant between the two groups.  
 
The descriptive statistics in Panel B of Table 6.2 show that the French mergers and 
liquidations analysis exhibits moderate differences to UK results. The mean statistics 
show that liquidated funds have higher means in prior year alpha, prior year skewness 
and family size compared to merged funds, but lower means in age, fund size and 
relative ranking than merged funds. Also from Panel B of table 6.2, it can be observed 
that the means of family size are statistically significantly different for the two groups 
at the 5% confidence level, while the means of age and alpha are statistically 
significantly different between the two groups at the 10% confidence level. The other 
variables, including the skewness, relative ranking and the size of the fund are not 
statistically significantly different between the two groups. 
 
                                                 
11 Note that the t-test and F-test are equivalent when there are only two means to compare. 
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 To summarize the above results, UK merged funds have statistically significantly 
higher age and higher skewness than liquidated funds at the 5% level, and statistically 
significantly higher family size than liquidated funds at the 10% level; in France 
liquidated funds have statistically significantly higher family size and higher alphas 
(at the year prior to termination) than merged funds at the 5% and 10% level, 
respectively, but statistically significantly lower age at termination than merged funds 
at the 10% level. These results suggest that French liquidated funds come from fund 
families that are statistically significantly larger than merged funds; they are younger 
at termination and have prior year alphas statistically significantly higher than merged 
funds. The statistically significant difference in age between merged and liquidated 
funds could be due to the fact that legacy products (a potential cause for strategic 
merger) are more likely to be older products. (The Treasury, 2007) 
 
Results from the logistic regression are shown in Table 6.3. It can be observed that for 
UK, none of the explanatory variables are statistically significant, except for alpha 
which is significant at 10%. This indicates in the UK, merged and liquidated funds do 
not exhibit much difference in terms of age, performance, size and family size. 
Interestingly, the regression coefficient for alpha is negative at -0.075 which suggests 
that liquidated funds have higher alphas than merged funds. One may argue that this 
result is contrary to the smart money literature which suggests that money flows into 
good past performers and flows out of poor past performers (Ippolito 1992, 
Goetzmann and Peles 1993, Gruber 1996, Zheng 1999). However, note that the alpha 
measure is at the year prior to fund termination, and this difference may be attributed 
to the timing differences in the period of underperformance of funds. Further analysis 
of this question is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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 Table 6.3 Logistic Regression Results  
 
Panel A: United Kingdom 
Variables in the Equation 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
AGE .003 .003 .657 1 .418 1.003 
ALPHA -.075 .044 2.882 1 .090* .928 
SKEWNESS 1.010 .753 1.798 1 .180 2.744 
SIZE .000 .000 .047 1 .829 1.000 
CATEGORY -.013 .015 .732 1 .392 .987 
FAMILY .011 .008 1.903 1 .168 1.011 
 
Constant -.505 1.585 .101 1 .750 .604 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: AGE, ALPHA, SKEWNESS, SIZE, CATEGORY, FAMILY. 
 
Panel B: France 
Variables in the Equation 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Age .002 .002 .990 1 .320 1.002 
Alpha -.045 .029 2.446 1 .118 .956 
Skewness -.042 .224 .034 1 .853 .959 
Size .000 .000 .117 1 .732 1.000 
Ranking .005 .006 .620 1 .431 1.005 
Family -.004 .002 4.815 1 .028** .996 
 
Constant -.699 .613 1.303 1 .254 .497 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Age, Alpha, Skewness, Size, Ranking, Family. 
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Panel B of Table 6.3 shows the logistic regression results for France. Similar to UK, 
most of the explanatory variables are not statistcally significant, with family size 
being the only significant variable. The result indicates that liquidated funds come 
from larger fund families than merged funds. This could be due to the ‘cross-fund 
subsidisation’ incentives of larger fund families, which involves enhancing the 
performance of some funds in the family even if it is at the expense of some other 
funds (Gaspar, Massa, and Matos 2005, Massa 2003).  
 
It is worth noting that although Chapter 5 shows that size is an important factor 
distinguishing between surviving funds and terminated funds, it is not statistically 
significantly different for the two types of mergers. As discussed in Chapter 5, the 
effect of fund size on the performance of a fund is subject to a considerable amount of 
debate in the academic community. Some evidence suggests that larger funds 
outperform smaller funds (Gallagher and Martin, 2005), while other evidence 
suggests that a smaller fund performs better due to its smaller price impact and 
benefits from lower transaction costs and administration costs (Beckers and Vaughan, 
2001 Chen et al, 2004, Droms and Walker, 1995, Ciccotello and Grant, 2001, Holmes 
and Faff, 2000 and Bilson, Frino and Heaney, 2004). This result supports Jayaraman, 
Khorana and Nelling (2002) which found that target funds are considerably smaller 
than acquiring funds. In comparison with the literature on corporate mergers and 
liquidation, this result consistent with Peel and Wilson (1989), who found that there is 
no significant difference in the mean size of the merged firms and liquidated firms. In 
conclusion, both merged and liquidated funds are statistically smaller than the 
 112 
 surviving funds, but there is no significant size effect between merged and liquidated 
funds. 
 
Although stepwise regression methods have associated statistical problems including 
biased R-squares, they have the advantage of being able to identify significant 
variables in a fairly methodical way. In this study forward stepwise logistic regression 
is used to identify significant variables that determine the termination status of a fund. 
The regression model is selected using the forward stepwise method, where the model 
begins with only a constant and adds a single explanatory variable at each step based 
on the significance of the score statistic. The final model is derived when none of the 
remaining explanatory variables have a significant score statistic.  
 
Panel A of Table 6.4 shows that skewness is the only explanatory variable present in 
the final regression model. Its regression coefficient is significant at the 5% level. The 
regression coefficient of 1.291 indicates that liquidated funds have lower skewness 
compared to merged funds. Panel B of Table 6.3 shows that removal of the variable 
“skewness” would make a significant difference to how well the model fits the 
observed data. Thus, skewness is retained in the model based on the forward stepwise 
method.  
 
Panel A shows that for variables not in the final equation, age and family size are both 
significant at the 10% level. Recall that the descriptive statistics and T-tests table 
show that merged funds have statistically significantly higher age and higher family 
size than liquidated funds at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. These logistic 
regression results provide support for the T-test results. 
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 Table 6.4 Logistic Regression Results – Forward Stepwise Method 
Panel A: UK 
Variables in the Equation 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
SKEWNESS 1.291 .645 4.010 1 .045** 3.638  
Constant -.307 .370 .689 1 .407 .735 
Variables not in the Equation 
   Score df Sig. 
AGE 3.255 1 .071* 
ALPHA 1.123 1 .289 
SIZE .048 1 .827 
RELATIVE RANKING 1.383 1 .240 
Variables 
FAMILY SIZE 3.145 1 .076* 
 
Overall Statistics 7.867 5 .164 
 
Panel B: France 
Variables in the Equation 
  B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Family -.004 .002 6.187 1 .013** .996  
Constant -.250 .242 1.069 1 .301 .779 
Variables not in the Equation 
   Score df Sig. 
AGE 1.245 1 .265 
ALPHA 3.200 1 .074* 
SKEWNESS .167 1 .682 
SIZE .069 1 .793 
Variables 
RELATIVE RANKING .735 1 .391 
 
Overall Statistics 4.784 5 .443 
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The logistic regression for French data again relies upon the forward stepwise 
method. Results from the logistic regression are shown in Table 6.4. Panel B of Table 
6.4 shows that “Family Size” is the only explanatory variable selected for the final 
regression model, with a regression coefficient significant at the 5% level. The 
regression coefficient of -0.004 indicates that liquidated funds have statistically 
significantly higher family size compared to merged funds. Panel B of Table 6.4 
shows that removal of the family size term would significantly deteriorate the 
predictive ability of the model. Panel C shows that for variables not in the equation, 
prior year alpha is significant at the 10% level. 
 
Since Skewness is the only variable existing in the final model, it is interesting to plot 
and compare the skewness of liquidated funds, merged funds and surviving funds. An 
error bar graph plots the mean for each condition with extended lines that show the 
confidence intervals.  
 
There are two observations drawn from Panel A of Figure 6.1. Firstly, funds are likely 
to be liquidated due to extreme negative values, as evidenced by the lower mean (in 
skewness) of the liquidated funds and the lower range of their confidence interval. 
This could be because funds with extreme negative returns, i.e. larger negative 
skewness, are more likely to face redemptions. 
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 Figure 6.1 Error Bar for Significant Variable 
Panel A: United Kingdom - Skewness 
 
Panel B: France – Family Size 
 
Note: 0 = Surviving, 1 = Liquidated, 2 = Merged 
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Secondly, the confidence interval for skewness of merged funds is larger than that of 
liquidated funds. A possible explanation for this result is that funds merge due to a 
wider range of causes than liquidations. For instance, some merged funds are 
positively skewed as they may be frequently achieving low returns, thus strategically 
merged into another fund; other mergers have been triggered by extreme negative 
values, and thus are negatively skewed mimicking liquidated funds. The existence of 
broader causes for mergers could lead to merged funds having a large confidence 
interval.  
 
With family size being the most significant explanatory variable that distinguishes 
between liquidated and merged funds in France, it is worth investigating this 
relationship further. Panel B of Figure 6.1 shows the error bar graph for mean family 
size for each type of fund with extended lines that show the confidence intervals. It 
can be observed that the family size of liquidated funds extend over a greater 
confidence interval compared to merged funds. In addition, the mean family size of 
liquidated funds is higher than that of merged funds. This indicates that liquidated 
funds come from larger families compared to merged funds. This result supports the 
findings of Massa (2003) and Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005), which found that 
fund families enhance the performance of certain “favourite” funds in the family even 
if it comes at a cost of generating bad performing funds.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
Using merger and liquidation data from the UK and France, this chapter analyses the 
difference in historical performance between liquidated funds, merged funds and 
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 surviving funds. It is found that for both countries merged funds have significantly 
lower alphas than surviving funds at the 5% level, while the difference in alphas 
between surviving and liquidated funds are not as significant. 
 
A series of t-tests for the explanatory variables in the UK indicate that merged funds 
have statistically significantly higher age and higher skewness than liquidated funds, 
while in France, liquidated funds come from fund families that are statistically 
significantly larger than merged funds. Interestingly, while size is significantly 
different between surviving and terminated funds, it is not significantly different 
between merged and liquidated funds.  
 
In the logistic regression models the binary dependent variable “Status” is a function 
of six continuous and/or categorical explanatory variables, namely age of the fund at 
termination, alpha as at the year prior to termination, relative ranking as at year prior 
to termination, skewness as at year prior to termination, fund size and family size. 
Logistic regression results suggest strong similarities between merged and liquidated 
funds. 
 
If more merger and liquidation data were available from the countries under study, it 
would be interesting to test the existence of the two types of mergers. However, the 
absence of mergers data from Australia and small sample size of mergers data from 
the UK and France precludes meaningful statistical tests of this relationship. This 
question is left for future research.  
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 Chapter 7 Weighting Strategy for Master Trusts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Having focused on the causes of managed fund mergers and liquidations in the 
previous two chapters, this chapter moves on to study the implications of managed 
fund merges and liquidations.  A master trust allows an investor to invest in a range of 
managed funds within one administrative structure and in turn may provide an 
effective protection from the risk of managed fund mergers and liquidations. Another 
type of product known as a “wrap account” is a very similar product to a master trust, 
except that it allows the investor to also include direct investments such as shares and 
property. This chapter’s analysis focuses on master trusts, nonetheless the results can 
be extended to wrap accounts. 
 
Common master trusts offer choices in Australian and international equity funds 
(including a choice in balanced, value or growth), fixed interest funds, property funds 
and cash funds. An example of an “investment menu” is that of Aon Master Trust as 
depicted in Table 7.1. Investors may spread their investment across a range of funds 
in the sector category and the pre-mixed category. The sector category consists of 
funds across different asset classes, whereas the pre-determined category consists of 
ready-made solutions with pre-determined weighting and automatic rebalancing. 
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Table 7.1 An Example of an Investment Menu - Aon Master Trust  
 
Pre-mixed category 
 
Sector Category 
 
High Growth - Index 
High Growth - Active 
 
Growth – Index 
Growth – Active 
 
Balanced – Index 
Balanced – Active 
 
Capital Stable – Index 
Capital Stable – Active 
 
Secure – Index 
Secure – Active 
 
Australian Shares – Index 
Australian Shares – Diversified 
Australian Shares – Core 
Australian Shares – Socially Responsible 
Australian Shares – Opportunities 
 
International Shares – Index 
International Shares – Index ($A hedged) 
International Shares – Diversified 
International Shares – Core 
International Shares – Core ($A hedged) 
International Shares – Emerging Markets 
International Shares – Opportunities 
 
Property – Australian Index 
Property – Diversified 
Property – Direct 
Property – Global Listed ($A hedged) 
 
Alternative – Diversified 
 
Fixed Interest – Australian Index 
Fixed Interest – International Index ($A 
hedged) 
Fixed Interest – Diversified 
Fixed Interest – Australian 
Fixed Interest – International ($A 
hedged) 
 
Cash 
 
Diversified – Maple-Brown Abbott 
 
 
Source: Aon master trust, Investment menu – Corporate Super and Personal Super, viewed 30 
November 2009, <http://www.aonmastertrust.com.au/invest.htm> 
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An important research question arises given that investors may pick and mix across 
the managed funds. With the weighting strategy now lying in investor hands, how 
should a rational investor spread his/her money across different funds in the Master 
Trust in order to achieve maximum return given his/her level of risk tolerance? 
 
“Naïve strategies” may be one solution. These are strategies that ignore information 
contained in past data, such as equal weighting across all funds (the equal weighting 
strategy), 80% equity and 20% fixed interest, or 30% in fund A, 40% in fund B and 
the rest in fund C. Nonetheless, the prominent finance theory Markowitz mean-
variance framework suggests that optimal weightings strategies can be derived 
through estimation of the expected return vector and the covariance matrix using 
historical data (Markowitz 1952). 
 
Are “optimal strategies” really optimal? In theory, there are situations where one may 
adopt naïve strategies over an optimal strategy. The first situation is when the 
portfolio contains assets with low idiosyncratic risk (DeMiguel, Garlappi & Uppal 
2009). As portfolios of assets such as managed funds have lower idiosyncratic risk 
than individual assets, a master trust investor may find a naive portfolio dominates an 
optimal portfolio. The second situation would occur where the time series is too short. 
In this case, mean variance analysis is subject to errors in estimating the expected 
return vector and the covariance matrix.  In the derivation of portfolio weightings, 
expected return, variance, and covariance estimates are often simply assumed to be 
equal to the ex-post sample values calculated from historical data.  As a result, the 
statistical characteristics of the optimised portfolios are likely to be significantly 
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 biased (Michaud 1989). The extent of the effect of estimation error on optimal 
portfolios has been documented in Jobson and Korkie (1981b) and, more recently, in 
Jagannathan and Ma (2003). Using Monte-Carlo simulation, Jobson and Korkie 
(1981b) conclude that even with a reasonably large sample (usually 4-7 years of 
monthly historical data) the estimated optimal portfolio is unlikely to be even close to 
the true optimal portfolio. Furthermore, a naïve strategy may outperform an optimal 
strategy when the number of assets in the portfolio is large. In this case, the benefit 
from weighting based on past information is minimal as even an equal weighting 
strategy can achieve good diversification. In addition, estimation error becomes a 
problem as the number of parameters being estimated by an optimal strategy is large. 
 
The previous chapters, which investigate merger and liquidation of managed funds, 
show that the time series data for managed funds is usually limited. This can make 
deriving weightings in master trusts more prone to estimation error compared with a 
managed fund that invests in stocks. As such, does a naïve strategy outperform an 
optimal strategy for a master trust investor? Provided there are shrinkage estimators 
which provide more accurate estimates of the input values for the Markowitz mean-
variance framework, can an investor achieve a better result through an optimal 
strategy adjusted for estimation error? This chapter explores these questions by 
comparing a master trust formed using a naïve strategy with master trusts formed 
using 
1) A traditional optimal weighting strategy; 
2) An optimal strategy adjusted for estimation error in mean; and 
3) An optimal strategy adjusted for estimation error in mean and variance. 
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 To proxy the effect of varying the numbers of assets in the portfolio, three sets of 
portfolios are constructed with the number of funds in the portfolio varying from 7 to 
48.   
 
The study relies on the more traditional shrinkage estimators, including the Bayes-
Stein estimator (Jorion 1986) to correct for estimation error in the ex-post return 
vector and the Ledoit and Wolf (2003) estimator to correct for estimation error in the 
covariance matrix. While Jagannathan and Ma (2003) show that short selling 
constraints can reduce the impact of estimation error, where a large cross-section of 
assets is concerned, this appears to be at the cost of selecting more concentrated 
portfolios and so this study relies on the more traditional shrinkage estimators in the 
analysis that follows.   
 
It is often suggested that the covariance matrix is more stable over time compared 
with variation in the mean return vector (Jorion (1985), Eun and Resnick (1988) and 
Izan, Jalleh and Ong (1991)).  While the covariance matrix may be more stable than 
the returns vector, the estimated correlation and covariance coefficients do change 
over time for a range of financial data (Speidell and Sappenfield, 1992, Shaked, 1985 
and Tuluca, Zwick and Seiler, 2003).  This variation could be due to estimation error, 
time variation in the underlying covariances or some combination of the two and so 
this chapter contributes to the literature by showing the impact of estimation error 
adjustment on master trust portfolio performance while allowing for the possibility of 
time variation in the underlying covariance estimates through the use of rolling 
estimation periods.   
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 Managed funds provide a means for investors to access markets not previously 
available to them (for example, overseas shares, wholesale funds and properties). 
International index funds are a common type of vehicle to access overseas markets 
and because they are well-diversified in their holdings they usually survive for a 
longer period. This makes index funds a good candidate for forming and testing 
master trust portfolios in this chapter. There is also sufficient historical data for 
repetitive estimation and testing of portfolios. MSCI and Standard and Poors country 
indices are used to represent before-fee returns on passively managed index funds.  
 
Section 2 introduces the Bayes-Stein estimator proposed by Jorion (1986) and the 
covariance estimator proposed by Ledoit and Wolf (2003) to address the possibility of 
estimation error in the expected return vector and in the covariance matrix 
respectively. Section 3 outlines the data and methodology. Section 4 records the 
results from application of the estimators in creating different master trust portfolio 
proxies. Two estimation periods (5 years and 8 years) and three hold out period 
returns (non-overlapping one-month and three-month periods and overlapping 12-
month periods) are used in comparisons. Finally, section 5 provides a summary of the 
results and draws some conclusions from the analysis. 
 
 
7.2 Adjustments for Estimation Error 
The Bayes-Stein estimator proposed by Jorion (1986) is used in this study to adjust 
for estimation error in returns. The Bayes-Stein estimator has been applied to mean-
variance optimisation problems with quite promising results (Eun and Resnick (1988) 
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 and Izan et al (1991)). It is an estimator obtained by “shrinking” the mean towards a 
common value, usually the grand mean, according to the formula: 
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In the extreme case where α = 1, the common value is the mean of the minimum 
variance portfolio. Using the mean of the minimum variance portfolio as the 
predictive return is equivalent to assuming that one cannot confidently decide that the 
stocks have different expected returns (Jobson and Korkie, 1981b). In contrast, in the 
case where α = 0, the common value is simply the ex-post sample mean return. 
 
This study uses the technique for shrinking the sample covariance matrix, to adjust for 
estimation error in the covariance matrix, recently proposed by Ledoit and Wolf 
(2004). In their paper, the sample covariance matrix is shrunk toward the shrinkage 
target.  In effect, extremely high coefficients, which are more likely to be estimated 
with positive error, are pulled downwards and extremely small coefficients, which are 
more likely to be estimated with negative error, are increased.  Ledoit and Wolf 
(2004) propose the constant-correlation model, in which all the (pair-wise) 
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 correlations are constant as an appropriate shrinkage target and this suggestion is 
followed in this chapter.  The formula for adjusting the covariance matrix is: 
SFShrink )ˆ1(ˆˆ δδ −+=Σ      (2) 
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Ledoit and Wolf (2004) conduct an empirical study to test the relative efficiency of 
their proposed covariance matrix estimator using monthly US stock data from 
February 1983 to December 2002.  They form portfolios based on the sample 
covariance matrix, the shrinkage estimator, and a multifactor estimator and find that 
out of all of the portfolios they create, the portfolio formed using the shrinkage 
estimator yields the highest Sharpe ratio, mean excess return, and the lowest standard 
deviation. 
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7.3 Data and Methodology 
The period under examination extends from January 1994 to March 2006. This study 
draws on monthly national stock index values to represent the before-fee returns on 
passively managed index funds. Index data, like the share price indices used here, is 
particularly useful for analysis as there is sufficient data to allow fairly exhaustive 
analysis of the impact of the shrinkage estimators.  There is quite limited time series 
data available for most mutual funds in comparison to the indices used in this study.  
However, it is important to note that a master trust portfolio may include funds that 
are more actively managed than index funds. Nevertheless the analysis is sufficient to 
address impacts of alternative approaches to forming portfolios of funds. 
 
Monthly observations are collected from Datastream (Thomson) and these include the 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) stock market indices where available 
for a country.  If there is no Morgan Stanley index for a country then the Standard and 
Poors IFC Global or the Standard and Poors IFC Global Frontier indices are used with 
either the daily or the monthly series selected according to that series which provided 
the most end of month observations.  Continuously compounding monthly returns are 
calculated for each index.  In all cases these returns are denominated in US dollars for 
simplicity and consistency. The 48 indices and the descriptive statistics of the indices 
are presented in Table 7.2. 
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 Table 7.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Index Fund Mean  
(%) 
Median 
(%) 
Std.Dev. 
(%) 
Maximu
m (%) 
Minimum 
(%) 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Argentina 0.434  1.495  11.416  42.472  -37.623  -0.269  1.853  
Australia 0.838  1.067  4.942  13.628  -14.470  -0.512  0.626  
Austria 0.818  1.020  5.273  12.457  -19.393  -0.523  0.754  
Belgium 0.935  1.438  5.101  16.713  -20.605  -1.004  3.332  
Brazil 1.129  2.441  12.103  31.320  -47.207  -0.817  2.243  
Canada 1.041  1.792  5.585  13.564  -24.547  -1.088  2.722  
Chile 0.553  0.378  6.968  18.341  -34.388  -0.934  3.694  
China -0.613  -0.096  10.852  38.415  -31.590  0.254  1.778  
Colombia 1.297  2.027  9.543  26.705  -26.728  -0.223  0.631  
Czech Rpb. 0.557  1.097  7.973  21.135  -28.324  -0.500  0.778  
Denmark 1.067  1.671  4.979  12.211  -14.368  -0.528  0.546  
Finland 1.565  0.813  10.121  28.716  -35.764  -0.422  1.636  
France 0.846  0.000  5.305  13.826  -18.883  -0.621  1.858  
Germany 0.741  0.000  5.939  19.033  -27.907  -0.991  4.480  
Hong Kong 0.311  0.000  7.482  32.461  -35.403  0.040  6.180  
Hungary 0.987  1.706  10.020  33.649  -48.084  -0.746  3.960  
India 0.741  0.000  8.317  27.031  -27.929  -0.078  1.190  
Indonesia -0.248  0.000  16.416  46.217  -84.927  -1.341  6.950  
Ireland 0.893  0.956  5.096  11.739  -15.477  -0.870  1.732  
Israel 0.536  0.000  8.131  24.421  -30.990  -0.755  2.421  
Italy 0.928  0.000  6.255  24.942  -19.888  -0.006  2.239  
Japan 0.082  -0.266  5.637  15.521  -12.224  0.159  -0.559  
Jordan 0.822  -0.053  4.886  19.144  -13.373  0.541  1.415  
Korean 0.566  0.066  12.167  53.414  -37.478  0.316  2.946  
Malaysia -0.124  0.367  9.774  40.578  -35.952  -0.071  3.936  
Mexico 0.618  2.183  9.721  17.513  -41.932  -1.417  3.921  
Netherlands 0.827  1.446  5.330  12.344  -19.604  -1.067  2.399  
New Zealand 0.548  1.207  6.095  14.781  -22.358  -0.773  1.418  
Nigeria 1.510  1.983  12.371  26.468  -121.140  -6.680  66.880  
Norway 1.018  1.239  6.468  15.584  -32.491  -0.958  4.126  
Pakistan 0.571  -0.233  11.465  31.865  -47.365  -0.323  2.387  
Peru 1.033  1.072  8.385  30.832  -40.982  -0.662  4.703  
Philippines -0.687  -0.728  9.521  36.040  -34.554  -0.001  2.279  
Poland 0.054  1.249  11.702  33.796  -42.803  -0.526  1.599  
Portugal 0.782  1.049  5.938  15.295  -21.512  -0.461  0.740  
Singapore 0.224  0.743  7.603  22.988  -22.859  -0.449  2.112  
South Africa 0.951  1.537  8.055  17.773  -36.403  -1.063  3.062  
Spain 1.095  1.199  5.970  15.020  -24.345  -0.584  1.988  
Sri Lanka 0.064  0.059  10.219  39.914  -28.974  0.429  2.280  
Sweden 1.124  1.528  7.365  20.627  -25.146  -0.482  1.326  
Switzerland 0.866  1.001  4.670  13.590  -16.998  -0.566  1.499  
Taiwan 0.050  -0.076  8.798  25.654  -24.507  0.077  0.360  
Thailand -0.547  -0.536  12.801  35.930  -41.571  -0.287  1.579  
Turkey 0.907  3.030  16.980  54.409  -53.178  -0.308  1.212  
the UK 0.704  0.700  3.881  9.896  -10.927  -0.342  0.026  
USA 0.836  1.286  4.293  9.517  -14.972  -0.684  0.820  
Venezuela 0.533  -0.149  14.510  48.155  -63.732  -0.804  4.201  
Zimbabwe -0.095  0.000  32.755  105.446  -257.365  -4.284  32.807  
Notes:  Monthly observations were collected from Datastream (Thomson).  Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) stock market indices were used where available, except in the case where there 
was a Standard and Poors IFC Global or frontier index with more observations available.  Monthly 
returns for each country index are denoted in terms of US dollars. 
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To assess the effect that differing fund size has on the weighing strategies for forming 
a master trust, 3 sets of portfolios are constructed, a 7 fund portfolio, a 24 fund 
portfolio and a 48 fund portfolio. The 7 fund portfolio includes index funds for 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and USA; The 24 fund portfolio 
includes index funds of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela and; The 
48 fund portfolio contains the above indices plus18 other indices including Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Hong Kong, Ireland, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and Zimbabwe. By constructing these three sets, one can study how the 
covariance shrinkage estimator affects portfolios of different size and make up. 
 
Within each of the three portfolio sizes, six master trust portfolios are formed and 
examined. These are (1) an equally weighted portfolio, the naïve portfolio. This 
approach is equivalent to assuming that there is no useful information in the historical 
data that distinguishes one asset from another; (2) the minimum variance portfolio 
based on classical mean-variance estimation. This portfolio depends only on the 
sample covariance matrix and does not include the impact of returns; (3) the tangency 
portfolio where both shrinkage factors are set to zero.  Estimation error is ignored in 
construction of this portfolio.  It is termed the classical tangency portfolio; (4) the 
Bayes-Stein tangency portfolio, which adjusts for estimation error in the return but 
ignores estimation error in the covariance matrix; the Ledoit & Wolf (2003) method 
for addressing the estimation error in covariance matrix is used in models (5) the 
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 mean and variance adjusted minimum variance portfolio and (6) the mean and 
variance adjusted tangency portfolio. Model (5) does not depend on mean returns and 
thus shows the effect of adjusting the covariance matrix for estimation error, while (6) 
combines the Bayes-Stein mean estimator with Ledoit & Wolf (2003)’s covariance 
estimator to identify the tangency portfolio.  This study does not impose short-selling 
constraints on analysis for simplicity though this is not an unrealistic assumption 
given that large well diversified master trust can replicate short positions through sale 
of existing assets with repurchase of the assets at the end of the investment horizon or 
through the use of an increasing range of derivatives that can be traded against share 
market indices around the world.      
 
There are 146 months of return data available for analysis. The first 107 monthly 
returns (which are used to derive 96 overlapping annual returns) are solely used for 
estimation of portfolio weightings. Performance of the portfolios is evaluated using 
the following 39 overlapping out-of-sample 12-month holding periods.  In the case of 
the 12-month holding period performance evaluation, the estimation period and the 
performance evaluation period are shifted forward by one month and the process 
continued month by month through to the end of the sample.12 The robustness for the 
out of sample performance of the portfolios is assessed using one-month and three-
month non-overlapping out-of-sample holding periods. In the case of the one-month 
holding period performance evaluation, the first 107 monthly observations are used 
for estimation of 96 overlapping annual returns, and the remaining 39 monthly 
observations are used to calculate non-overlapping one-month holding period returns. 
                                                 
12 For example, where this study uses the 107 month (eight years) estimation period, the observations 
in the first 107-month estimation period includes the months 1 to 107 and the holding period used for 
performance evaluation consists of months 108 to 119.  The portfolios for the second holding period 
(months 109 to 120) are based on the estimation period from months 2 to 108, and so on. This portfolio 
formation procedure generates 39 overlapping 12-month holding period returns. 
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 In the case of the three-month holding period performance evaluation, the first 71 
monthly observations are used for estimation of 60 non-overlapping three-month 
returns, and the following 75 monthly observations are used to calculate 25 non-
overlapping three-month holding period returns. The weighting calculations are 
shifted forward by three months each time. 
 
Both the mean and the standard deviation of holdout period portfolio returns are 
reported for each of the portfolios, equally weighted portfolio, minimum variance 
portfolio, classical tangency portfolio, Bayes-Stein tangency portfolio, mean and 
variance adjusted minimum variance portfolio and mean and variance adjusted 
tangency portfolio.  Since most risk-adverse investors are interested in their 
portfolio’s risk-return relationship, a widely used portfolio performance index, the 
Sharpe index, is also computed for each of the portfolios based on the average of the 
39 sets of portfolio excess return and standard deviation, pfp RR σ/)( − . The risk-free 
rate of interest is assumed to be the average annual yield on 3-month U.S. Treasury 
Bills over the entire estimation period. 
 
To more formally assess the relative performance of the portfolios, the significance of 
the differences in Sharpe measures are tested using the Jobson and Korkie (1981a) 
pair-wise test statistic: 
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where sj is the standard deviation of portfolio j, rj is the excess mean of portfolio j and  
sij is the covariance between portfolios i and j. 
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 The Sharpe ratios can be calculated using non-overlapping periods such as one month 
or three months or using 12-month overlapping periods.  The 12-month performance 
measures are probably more realistic for comparison purposes and so this chapter 
reports. Yet, performance measures based on one month and three-month non-
overlapping periods are also calculated and reported.  Because the 12-month variance 
estimates are based on overlapping data this study uses the Lo and MacKinlay (1989) 
variance adjustment.  This is probably a rather conservative adjustment (Bod et al 
2002) although choice of adjustment has little impact on the reported 12-month 
results.   
 
7.4 Shrinkage effects on the efficient frontier 
Figure 7.1, Panel A, shows the effect of shrinkage on the efficient frontier estimated 
using the first 107 monthly return observations in the sample. The line indexed by the 
word “Classical” corresponds to the usual case where the sample return vector and the 
sample covariance matrix are used to compute the efficient frontier . 
With Bayes-Stein estimation for the mean , the efficient frontier 
becomes flatter, and shrinks toward the common mean, as shown by the line “Bayes-
Stein”. The Classical efficient frontier and Bayes-Stein efficient frontier have a 
common minimum variance portfolio. This arises because the minimum variance 
strategy implicitly assumes that no useful information is present in the expected return 
vector and asset selection for this portfolio implicitly depends only on the covariance 
coefficients. Essentially, both the classical efficient frontier and the Bayes-Stein 
efficient frontier use the same sample covariance matrix. This is consistent with the 
results reported by Jorion (1985). 
)0ˆ,0ˆ( == δα
)0ˆ,6313.0ˆ( == δα
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 Figure 7.1 Efficient Frontier Estimated for the 7 Funds Portfolio, the 24 Funds 
Portfolio and the 48 Funds Portfolio 
Panel A: 7 Funds Portfolio 
 
Panel B: 24 Funds Portfolio 
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 Panel C: 48 Funds Portfolio 
 
Note: Classical refers to the Markowitz mean variance frontier using historical data, Bayes-Stein refers 
to the Markowitz mean variance frontier using historical data with Bayes-Stein adjusted expected 
returns and Mean-Variance-Shrink refers to the Markowitz mean variance frontier using historical data 
with Bayes-Stein adjusted expected returns vector and Ledoit and Wolf (2004) adjustment to the 
covariance matrix.   The return and covariance estimates underlying these graphs are based on the first 
107 monthly returns in the sample. 
 
 
The line indexed by Mean-Variance-Shrink shows the effect of shrinkage adjustment 
for both the portfolio return and the portfolio covariance matrix. In this case, the 
shrinkage factor for returns remains the Bayes-Stein estimate of 0.6313, while the 
shrinkage factor for covariance coefficients increases from 0 to 0.4299. It is apparent 
that shrinking the covariance flattens the efficient frontier further and the minimum 
variance point is shifted to the right. Thus, with shrinkage of the covariance matrix, 
the efficient frontier moves to the right and implied portfolio risk increases for each 
level of average portfolio return increases. 
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 Figure 7.1 plots the efficient frontier comparisons for the three sets of master trust. 
The first graph in Panel A of Figure 7.1 represents various efficient frontiers for the 7 
funds portfolio, while the second graph, Panel B of Figure 7.1, represents the 24 funds 
portfolio and the third graph, Panel C of Figure 7.1, represents the 48 funds portfolio. 
It is important to note the variation in impact of the shrinkage estimators on the 
various efficient frontiers.  While there appears to be considerable benefits from 
choosing a master trust consisting of 48 funds or 24 funds there is much less benefit 
apparent from choosing the 7 funds portfolio.  In particular, the Bayes-Stein efficient 
frontier is quite close to the Mean-Variance-Shrink efficient frontier for the 7 fund 
portfolio. 
 
 
7.5 Portfolio performance 
There are a number of key assumptions that are required when assessing portfolio 
performance.  It is necessary to choose a criterion for comparison.  The Sharpe 
measure is chosen for this task due to its wide use in practise, although average return 
and standard deviation are also reported in the results tables.  It is also necessary to 
select an investment horizon over which performance is calculated.  While a 12-
month horizon is used for the results in the following discussion, performance over 
one-month and three-month non-overlapping hold out periods are also estimated.  
These results are reported separately in Tables 2 and 3.  
 
Table 7.3 summarises the performance of the various portfolios constructed for each 
of the three types of portfolios. Panel A of Table 7.3 presents the performance results 
for the 7 fund portfolio. Examination of Sharpe measures for the 7 fund portfolio 
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 shows that the equally weighted portfolio, the mean and variance adjusted minimum 
variance portfolio and the minimum variance portfolio perform most strongly.  The 
classical tangency portfolio, which ignores the problem of estimation error, produced 
the worst results over the holding period, giving the lowest average Sharpe index. The 
Bayes-Stein approach for controlling estimation error in the mean returns does result 
in improved return and reduced risk though this is further improved with the 
application of shrinkage adjustment to both return and covariance matrices in the 
mean and variance adjusted tangency portfolio. Again, the minimum variance 
portfolios, which totally ignore the problem of expected return estimation, provide 
further improvement in performance, with additional increases in the return and 
reductions in the risk.  
 
The results for Panel B are quite similar to those reported in Panel A.  The Sharpe 
measures favour the minimum variance portfolio, the equally weighted portfolio and 
the mean and variance adjusted minimum variance portfolio in this order. The Sharpe 
measures calculated for the tangency portfolios are considerably smaller than those of 
the more naïve approaches noted above.  Of the three tangency portfolios the mean 
and variance adjusted tangency portfolio is ranked first, the Bayes-Stein tangency 
portfolio is ranked second and the classical tangency portfolio is ranked last of the 
three in virtually all comparisons.  It appears that expected return estimation is fraught 
with difficulty, particularly where it is based purely on historical data.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 136 
 Table 7.3 Portfolio Construction Strategy Out-of-Sample Performance 
Panel A. 7 Funds Portfolio 
 
Mean Return Standard Deviation Sharpe Index Strategy 
Monthly Quarterly Annually Monthly Quarterly Annually Monthly Quarterly Annually 
EWP 0.0089 0.0381 0.1587 0.0456 0.0887 0.1806 0.1239 0.3927 0.6624 
MVP 0.0061 0.0333 0.1061 0.0429 0.0757 0.1841 0.0671 0.397 0.3643 
CTP -0.0007 -0.0265 -0.0575 0.1304 0.3415 0.5141 -0.0301 -0.0871 -0.1878 
BSTP 0.002 0.0000 0.0138 0.0729 0.1877 0.2601 -0.017 -0.0173 -0.0971 
MVSMVP 0.0065 0.0344 0.1144 0.043 0.0773 0.1827 0.0759 0.4034 0.4128 
MVSTP 0.0047 0.0114 0.055 0.0728 0.1764 0.2194 0.0196 0.0464 0.0731 
 
Panel B. 24 Funds Portfolio 
 
Mean Return Standard Deviation Sharpe Index Strategy 
Monthly Quarterly Annually Monthly Quarterly Annually Monthly Quarterly Annually 
EWP 0.019 0.0647 0.3046 0.0454 0.0836 0.1788 0.3477 0.7354 1.4856 
MVP 0.0201 0.0597 0.2741 0.0305 0.069 0.1438 0.5515 0.8179 1.6349 
CTP -0.0075 -0.0443 -0.3054 0.1949 0.4001 0.9201 -0.0552 -0.1188 -0.3743 
BSTP 0.0119 0.0217 0.0761 0.0755 0.1645 0.4093 0.115 0.1124 0.0906 
MVSMVP 0.0229 0.0657 0.313 0.0348 0.0805 0.1953 0.5655 0.7755 1.4032 
MVSTP 0.0117 0.026 0.1641 0.0758 0.1589 0.4068 0.1113 0.1432 0.3074 
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Panel C. 48 Funds Portfolio 
 
Mean Return Standard Deviation Sharpe Index Strategy 
Monthly Quarterly Annually Monthly Quarterly Annually Monthly Quarterly Annually 
EWP 0.0158 0.0546 0.2418 0.0399 0.0794 0.1559 0.3158 0.6461 1.3011 
MVP 0.0147 0.0448 0.1985 0.0324 0.053 0.0997 0.3525 0.7848 1.6005 
CTP -0.0913 -0.1479 -1.2167 0.559 0.472 5.0005 -0.1691 -0.3203 -0.2511 
BSTP -0.0224 -0.0181 -0.2652 0.1971 0.1789 1.7619 -0.1302 -0.1192 -0.1727 
MVSMVP 0.0173 0.0518 0.2419 0.0322 0.0695 0.1648 0.4368 0.6989 1.2313 
MVSTP 0.0085 0.0156 0.0945 0.0589 0.1192 0.3685 0.0889 0.1034 0.1506 
 
Note 1:  Monthly returns are the average of the 39 non-overlapping out-of-sample estimates; Quarterly 
returns are the average of the 10 non-overlapping out-of-sample estimates; Annual returns are the 
average of the 39 overlapping out-of-sample estimates.   
 
Note 2: Abbreviations 
Equal Weights Portfolio  EWP 
Minimum Variance Portfolio  MVP 
Classical Tangency Portfolio  CTP 
Bayes-Stein Tangency Portfolio  BSTP 
Mean and variance adjusted minimum variance portfolio  MVSMVP 
Mean and variance adjusted Tangency Portfolio  MVSTP 
 
 
Panel C of Table 7.3 records the performance for the 48 fund portfolio. Again, the 
results follow those of Panel A and Panel B fairly closely. The naïve portfolios 
perform best, though there is some consistent ranking among the tangency portfolios 
with shrinkage adjustment improving the Sharpe ranking of these portfolios.   
 
These results suggest that there are benefits to be had from adjusting for estimation 
error, although it is not clear that tangency portfolios would be particularly useful to 
master trust investors in portfolio selection given the use of historical data and the 
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 holding period results reported in this chapter. Where tangency portfolios based on 
historical data are to be used, a master trust investor is best to base their portfolio 
weightings on both shrinkage adjusted expected returns and a shrinkage adjusted 
covariance matrix for each of the three portfolios described above.  Were a master 
trust investor to base their portfolio construction decision on a minimum variance 
portfolio then it is not clear, from the results discussed above, that a shrinkage 
adjusted covariance matrix will always provide superior results.  
 
Perhaps the most striking result appearing in Table 7.3 is the poor performance of 
portfolios that ignore estimation error (i.e. the classical tangency portfolio). This 
result provides an indication of the poor forecasting accuracy of past sample averages 
and past sample covariance coefficients. Similar results indicating the poor 
performance of the classical tangency approach are also noted in Jorion (1985, 1986), 
Eun and Resnick (1988), and Izan et al(1991) and Jagannathan and Ma (2003).   
 
Another result that should be noted is the above-average performance of the equal 
weighted approach. This has been noted in several studies, including Gilmore and 
McManus (2002), Kohers et al (1998,) and Izan et al (1991), and it is usually argued 
that the equal weighted approach performs well because of the low quality of 
information that is extracted from historical data. The performance of the two 
minimum variance portfolio strategies is also consistent with the equal weighted 
approach.  The mean and variance adjusted minimum variance portfolio and the 
minimum variance portfolio generally emerge either second or third ranked in the 
analysis above.   
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 Table 7.4 Statistical Comparison of Performance 
Panel A. 7 Funds Portfolio 
  MVP CTP BSTP MVSMVP MVSTP 
Monthly 1.1055 0.8225 0.94 1.0307 0.8002 
Quarterly -0.0497 1.1833 1.1461 -0.147 1.0402 
EWP 
Annually 7.868** 3.3513** 3.4810** 7.5313** 3.1075** 
Monthly  0.5523 0.6261 -0.9683 0.4111 
Quarterly  1.3417 1.3517 -0.3967 1.2368 
MVP 
Annually  2.2409** 2.2002** -8.8150** 1.6011 
Monthly   -0.2621 -0.5977 -0.6737 
Quarterly   -1.0451 -1.3303 -1.3785 
CTP 
Annually   -1.6337** -2.4287** -2.8835** 
Monthly    -0.6823 -1.0438 
Quarterly    -1.3341 -1.6499* 
BSTP 
Annually    -2.4212** -4.0701** 
Monthly     0.4822 
Quarterly     1.2243 
MVSMVP 
Annually     1.8601* 
 
Panel B. 24 Funds Portfolio 
  MVP CTP BSTP MVSMVP MVSTP 
Monthly -1.1831 2.2308** 1.3997 -1.2571 1.516 
Quarterly -0.3638 2.6568** 2.5523** -0.1605 2.4208** 
EWP 
Annually -1.4520 10.7016** 9.9035** 0.6715 8.4103** 
Monthly  3.0385** 2.6327* -0.2824 2.9023** 
Quarterly  2.4232** 2.3347** 0.5137 2.7218** 
MVP 
Annually  14.1519** 14.6137** 7.2646** 14.6453** 
Monthly   -3.6063** -3.2832** -2.0765** 
Quarterly   -2.0935** -2.402** -1.3903 
CTP 
Annually   -10.5813** -13.8668** -10.8867** 
Monthly    -2.8804** 0.0629 
Quarterly    -2.2569** -0.2571 
BSTP 
Annually    -13.6627** -5.9516** 
Monthly     3.3671** 
Quarterly     2.7562** 
MVSMVP 
Annually     14.4374* 
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Panel C. 48 Funds Portfolio 
  MVP CTP BSTP MVSMVP MVSTP 
Monthly -0.1899 2.459** 2.2973** -0.8802 1.6389** 
Quarterly -0.4709 3.533** 3.2019** -0.2671 2.43** 
EWP 
Annually -2.6165** 9.5921** 9.5288** 0.8888 8.4720** 
Monthly  2.6393** 2.6196** -0.6388 1.8519* 
Quarterly  3.3641** 3.1224** 0.358 3.2973** 
MVP 
Annually  10.9348** 10.8821** 5.5771** 12.1658** 
Monthly   -1.853* -2.8532** -1.6084 
Quarterly   -3.2793** -3.71** -2.6744** 
CTP 
Annually   -7.1347** -9.2035** -3.2378** 
Monthly    -2.7903** -1.3983 
Quarterly    -3.4553** -1.8966* 
BSTP 
Annually    -9.0411** -2.6209** 
Monthly     2.7568** 
Quarterly     3.7072** 
MVSMVP 
Annually     11.6384** 
Note:  * Significant at the 5% level, ** Significant at the 1% level. EWP = equally weighted 
portfolio, MVP = minimum variance portfolio, CTP = Classical Tangency Portfolio, BSTP = Bayes-
Stein tangency portfolio, MVSMVP = mean and variance adjusted minimum variance portfolio, 
MVSTP = mean and variance adjusted tangency portfolio 
 
Next the statistical significance of these differences in portfolio performance is 
investigated.  Table 7.4 reports the Jobson and Korkie (1981a) pairwise test statistics 
for equal performance. Although this test is reported to have low power (Jobson and 
Korkie 1981a, Jorion 1985), a large number of statistically significant entries are 
found in the analysis. The Bayes-Stein tangency portfolio significantly outperforms 
the classical tangency portfolio, while the mean and variance adjusted tangency 
portfolio significantly outperforms the Bayes-Stein tangency portfolio, with exception 
of the 7 funds portfolio. This shows that shrinking the mean return can improve 
performance above the classical approach, while shrinking both the mean and the 
covariance can further improve performance.  The level of statistical significance does 
vary with the horizon that is selected for performance assessment.  There is a 
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 somewhat greater incidence of statistically significant differences reported for the 
overlapping 12-month results than for the non-overlapping one-month and three-
month horizons and this is particularly so for the 7 fund portfolio when using the 
three-month horizon.  Variation in statistical significance across performance horizon 
is generally found with similar approaches such as the minimum variance portfolios 
for example.   
 
Most of the conclusions drawn from the results in Table 7.3 are shown to be 
statistically significant in Table 7.4. These results reinforce our prior findings that the 
tangency portfolio that controls for estimation error in both the return and covariance 
(i.e. the mean and variance adjusted tangency portfolio) outperforms both the classical 
tangency portfolio, which is not adjusted for estimation error, and the Bayes-Stein 
tangency portfolio, which only controls for estimation error in the mean. The classical 
tangency portfolio is outperformed by the investment strategies that control for 
estimation error in some way. In particular, the equally weighted portfolio, minimum 
variance portfolio and the mean and variance adjusted minimum variance portfolio 
dominate the classical tangency portfolio by a large margin and are the three best 
performing portfolios among all of the strategies. 
 
The results discussed so far are based on a 107 month estimation period with a 39 
month hold-out period.  The results were also replicated using a 71 month estimation 
period and a 75 month hold out period to assess the impact of estimation and holding 
period choice.  The results for the overlapping 12-month holding period are reported 
in Tables 7.5 and 7.6 and the results are broadly consistent with the results discussed 
above.    
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Table 7.5 Robustness Test on Out-of Sample Performance with 6.25 years Out-
of-Sample Period 
Panel A. 7 Funds Portfolio 
Strategy Mean 
Return 
Standard 
Deviation 
Sharpe 
Index 
Equal Weights Portfolio  0.0396 0.2266 0.0028 
Minimum Variance Portfolio  -0.0133 0.1750 -0.2987 
Classical Tangency Portfolio  0.1639 2.5629 0.0487 
Bayes-Stein Tangency Portfolio  0.0472 0.9190 0.0089 
Mean and variance adjusted minimum variance portfolio  0.0022 0.1813 -0.2028 
Mean and variance adjusted Tangency Portfolio  -0.0098 0.3554 -0.1372 
 
Panel B. 24 Funds Portfolio 
Strategy Mean 
Return 
Standard 
Deviation 
Sharpe 
Index 
Equal Weights Portfolio  0.1280 0.2759 0.3225 
Minimum Variance Portfolio  0.0858 0.2159 0.2169 
Classical Tangency Portfolio  0.0498 16.3094 0.0007 
Bayes-Stein Tangency Portfolio  0.0507 6.2226 0.0019 
Mean and variance adjusted minimum variance portfolio  0.1586 0.2004 0.5966 
Mean and variance adjusted Tangency Portfolio  -1.2392 10.3719 -0.1232 
 
Panel C. 48 Funds Portfolio 
Strategy Mean 
Return 
Standard 
Deviation 
Sharpe 
Index 
Equal Weights Portfolio  0.1023 0.2215 0.2857 
Minimum Variance Portfolio  0.0416 0.2424 0.0108 
Classical Tangency Portfolio  -2.2274 17.1286 -0.1323 
Bayes-Stein Tangency Portfolio  -0.1477 1.2800 -0.1459 
Mean and variance adjusted minimum variance portfolio  0.1003 0.1978 0.3099 
Mean and variance adjusted Tangency Portfolio  0.1620 0.8322 0.1478 
 
Note:  In each cell, the number represents the average of the 75 overlapping out-of-sample estimates.   
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Table 7.6 Robustness Test on Statistical Comparison of Performance 
Panel A. 7 Funds Portfolio 
  EWP MVP CTP BSTP MVSMVP MVSTP 
EWP  6.9760** -0.2760 -0.0386 5.9914** 1.0448 
MVP   -2.1094** -1.9895** -8.1685** -1.2566 
CTP    2.6870** 1.5213 3.2950** 
BSTP     1.3614 3.1360** 
MVSMVP      -0.5075 
 
Panel B. 24 Funds Portfolio 
  EWP MVP CTP BSTP MVSMVP MVSTP 
EWP  1.9765* 2.0329** 2.0370** -4.1136** 3.1500** 
MVP   1.4122 1.4131 -8.1654** 2.4914** 
CTP    -0.4470 -3.7616** 1.0669 
BSTP     -3.7784** 1.0659 
MVSMVP      4.8910** 
 
Panel C. 48 Funds Portfolio 
  EWP MVP CTP BSTP MVSMVP MVSTP 
EWP  2.5745** 2.5261** 2.6306** -0.3330 0.9817 
MVP   0.8845 1.0095 -4.3121** -0.9602 
CTP    0.2298 -2.7198** -2.0435** 
BSTP     -2.8667** -2.0543** 
MVSMVP      1.1552 
 
Note:  * Significant at the 5% level, ** Significant at the 1% level. EWP = equally weighted 
portfolio, MVP = minimum variance portfolio, CTP = Classical Tangency Portfolio, BSTP = Bayes-
Stein tangency portfolio, MVSMVP = mean and variance adjusted minimum variance portfolio, 
MVSTP = mean and variance adjusted tangency portfolio 
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Overall, the analysis confirms the strong performance of the minimum variance 
portfolios as well as the equally weighted portfolio, with these strategies providing 
superior performance relative to the alternatives. Finally, in most cases, the classical 
tangency portfolio strategy is dominated by the various alternatives included in this 
study. 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
This chapter uses share price indices as proxies for market tracking funds in order to 
investigate the impact of various approaches to master trust portfolio construction.  
The Markowitz mean-variance model inspired numerous extensions and applications, 
yet it has been well documented that estimation error in parameter values prevails in 
applications of this approach.  While the literature provides substantial evidence of 
the benefits of adjusting for estimation error in historical data based expected return 
estimates, adjustment for estimation error in the covariance matrix is often ignored.  
The limited data that is available in choosing appropriate weighting schemes for funds 
means that master trust construction is especially prone to estimation error and so one 
contribution of this analysis is the use of share price index data thus ensuring that 
there is sufficient data available to compare the various alternative portfolio 
construction methods using well known statistical tests as well as simple comparisons 
of Sharpe measure, mean and variance or standard deviation.  Another contribution of 
this chapter is the application of the Ledoit and Wolf (2003) shrinkage adjusted 
covariance estimator to the master trust portfolio construction problem.  It is found 
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 that the Ledoit and Wolf (2003) covariance estimator flattens the efficient frontier 
relative to traditional approaches and changes the minimum variance portfolio.  
 
Six investment portfolios are formed using three sets of equity market indices as 
proxies for international equity funds. Examination of the investment strategies 
implicit in these portfolios shows that the tangency portfolio that controls for 
estimation error in both the return and covariance (i.e. the mean and variance adjusted 
tangency portfolio) outperforms both the classical tangency portfolio, which is not 
adjusted for estimation error, and the Bayes-Stein tangency portfolio, which only 
controls for estimation error in the mean. Inevitably, the classical tangency portfolio is 
outperformed by the investment strategies that control for estimation error in some 
way. In particular, the equally weighted portfolio, minimum variance portfolio and the 
mean and variance adjusted minimum variance portfolio dominate the classical 
tangency portfolio by a large margin and are the three best performing portfolios 
among all of the strategies.  Yet, it is important to note that where tangency portfolios 
are used estimation error in both the mean return vector and covariance matrix should 
be properly accounted for. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter summarises the key empirical findings in this thesis and draws 
conclusions from the findings, reinforces the importance and contribution of this 
research to the literature and to practitioners, discusses limitations of the research and 
suggests extension for further research. 
 
8.2 Thesis Contributions 
 
This thesis examines mergers and liquidations of managed funds, conducted in the 
context of Australian, French and the UK managed fund portfolios. This research is 
motivated by the significant economic and social consequences of mergers and 
liquidations of managed funds and the relative scarcity of such research in the 
literature. This thesis is important as prior literature on managed fund risk is generally 
limited to risks in fund returns while managed funds are in fact subject to multiple 
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 types of risks. This thesis extends the prior literature through investigating the risk of 
fund mergers and liquidations, identifying some explanatory factors that help to 
explain fund mergers and liquidations.  
 
Further, although liquidation provisions are available in Australian law, current 
legislation does not facilitate mergers. As such, the Government is considering 
introducing merger provisions, but details of the merger provisions generate 
considerable debate among the financial services industry and the general public. As 
the regulation of fund mergers is still an open question in Australia, this thesis 
provides an indication of the impact of fund liquidation and merger in Australia as 
well as in the UK and France. 
 
Overall, the results in this thesis highlight, firstly, the importance of an awareness of 
survival probabilities when investing in managed funds. Examination of fund births 
and terminations over time and age distributions of dead funds found that funds that 
terminate generally terminate at a young age. Using the Kaplan-Meier estimator for 
survival functions to estimate probabilities of survival from historical data, it was 
found that survival probabilities deteriorate at a faster rate as the age of the fund 
grows. There is approximately an 18% chance that an Australian fund will terminate 
before the age of 5 years, and a 35% chance that it will terminate before the age of 10 
years. The log rank and Wilcoxon tests are used to test whether the survival functions 
of different categories of funds are statistically different, and it is found that there are 
differences in survival probabilities between different fund categories, in particular, 
allocation (balanced) funds have a higher probability of survival than alternative 
funds, which include funds such as hedge funds.  
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The results in this thesis also highlight some of the factors that affect the survival 
probabilities of managed funds. Cox regression results show that size is significant in 
that a larger fund is less likely to terminate. Also, the factors that impact survival are 
similar between Australia and France but slightly different between Australia and the 
UK. In Australia and France, funds with higher alphas are less likely to terminate, and 
in the UK funds from larger fund families are less likely to terminate.  In addition, it 
is found that merged funds and liquidated funds exhibit statistically significant 
difference in skewness and family size (extent of difference is country dependent), but 
do not exhibit statistically significant differences in terms of fund size. 
 
Overall, the results in this thesis highlight, the importance of mitigating the risks of 
mergers and liquidations. Master trusts allow investors to invest in a range of 
managed funds within one administrative structure, and thus could help to diversity 
against fund termination risk. However, because time series data for managed funds is 
usually limited due to fund births and terminations, the problem of estimation error is 
particularly prominent in master trust portfolios. This thesis investigates alternative 
weighting schemes for master trusts and addresses the problem of estimation error in 
forming master trusts. While estimation error adjustments for the mean are well 
known, this is not the case for the covariance matrix. Thus, the thesis uses the 
covariance matrix adjustment put forward by Ledoit and Wolf (2003) to study a 
weighting strategy for master trust portfolio construction. Using 48 international 
indices to represent the returns on passively managed index funds, it is found that 
adjusting the covariance matrix flattens the efficient frontier and changes the 
minimum variance portfolio relative to the more traditional methods and that 
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 minimum variance and mean-variance-shrink portfolios are the best performing 
weighting schemes 
 
8.3 Limitations and Extensions 
The research in this thesis suggests several avenues for future research. For instance, 
managers and investors are likely to be interested in other factors driving the mergers 
and liquidations of managed funds. Due to availability of data, five coefficients were 
included in the Cox regression model for survival probabilities, namely alpha, relative 
ranking, skewness, size and family size. Future studies could include other factors, 
such as the manager’s education, the manager’s experience, degree of diversification 
of investments, asset allocation and management fee, though this information is not 
available at present for the sample used in analysis. 
 
This thesis restricts analysis to Australia, France and the UK due to the similarities in 
the size of their respective managed funds industries, and comparable regulatory 
environments. It is found that differences in survival probabilities and explanatory 
factors for survival rates exist among countries. As such, it is interesting to explore 
the differences in survival probabilities of managed funds and mergers and 
liquidations of managed funds among a larger group of economies. Future studies 
could include other markets, including the Asian economies, China, Singapore, and 
Malaysia, and emerging markets such as India, Thailand and Indonesia. 
 
Survivorship expectations may provide important information in the selection of 
funds for inclusion in master trusts. A possible extension to this thesis draws on the 
explanatory factors on mergers and liquidations and studies whether one can form a 
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 better-performing master trust portfolio based on predicted survival probabilities. This 
study requires estimation of survival probabilities from rolling sampling periods and 
testing over subsequent periods. Portfolios could be formed consisting of those funds 
with the highest predicted survival probabilities. The performance of these survival 
ranked portfolios is compared with the performance of randomly selected portfolios 
from the overall population of funds. Results may suggest that survival probabilities 
of funds have a significant impact on the performance of master trust portfolios, and 
in turn, fund survival probabilities of funds are useful in selecting funds for inclusion 
in master trust portfolios.  
 
Jensen’s alpha, as a portfolio evaluation tool, has been the subject of much criticism 
over many decades. For instance, many equity fund managers simply exploit the value 
and size effects which, using a one factor model, is attributed to skill rather than some 
ex-ante risk premia. Future extensions of this work could include to a better proxy of 
manager skill, such as the Fama and French three-factor alpha, or Carhart’s four-
factor alpha. 
 
A model is presented in Chapter 3 to conceptualise the causes of mergers and 
liquidations. In particular, the model describes two types of mergers, namely strategic 
mergers, which are driven by strategic decisions made by managed fund companies, 
and distressed mergers, which are usually forced mergers initiated by the creditors or 
the court, or where the fund has triggered a provision for wind up in its own 
constitution. While the model is useful for conceptualizing the different causes of 
mergers and liquidations, it is extremely difficult to empirically test using historical 
data. It is because merged funds data do not report the reasons for mergers and the 
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 limited availability of merged fund data precludes using data mining techniques to 
separate the funds into groups. Chapter 6 examines a more empirically testable 
problem drawn from the model, that is, whether mergers and liquidations may be 
distinguished by certain fund characteristics. If enough mergers and liquidations data 
was available for the countries under study, it would be interesting to test the 
existence of the two types of mergers.  
 
Last but not least, for the analysis in chapter 7, data restrictions for managed funds 
data makes estimation of covariance matrices particularly complex. International 
index funds are used in analysis because they usually survive for a longer period. This 
makes index funds a good candidate for forming and testing master trust portfolios. 
There is also sufficient historical data for repetitive estimation and testing of 
portfolios. An extension would be to include methods to estimate covariance matrix 
from an uneven sample to form and test master trust portfolios using managed funds 
data other than index funds. 
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 Appendices 
 
Appendix A:  
If F(t) has probability mass at t1,…,tk, the discrete hazard function is, 
[ ] )1(,| JjtTtTP jjj ≤≥≥==λ  
This is the probability an individual has the ending event at time tj, given they had not 
yet had the even tat the beginning of time unit tj. 
 
The likelihood function can be rewritten in terms of the cdf F, 
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The expression becomes 
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The likelihood is then 
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